Cross-Strait Tensions in Taiwan: a Potential “Flashpoint” of the Asia-Pacific region?

In March 2000, Taiwanese opposition leader Chen Shui-bian took office as the territory’s first non-Nationalist President, raising fears in the Asia Pacific region that the ascendancy of pro-independence forces would result in war across the Taiwan Strait. Indeed Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji clearly conveyed the intentions of the mainland, saying that 1.25 billion Chinese would be willing to “spill blood” to prevent Taiwanese independence.[1] These emotional sentiments highlight the fragility of the China-Taiwan relationship, maintaining that Cross-Strait tensions are still an important security dilemma in the Asia Pacific region. This paper will therefore examine the Taiwan issue and the extent to which it has become a “flashpoint” in Asia Pacific security studies, contending that while the circumstances in Taiwan are potentially explosive, it is not yet at a point to erupt into an immediate crisis situation.[2]

A study of prevailing literature outlines three perspectives from which the Taiwan issue has been considered as a “flashpoint”. This can be explained in terms of China’s increasing aspirations for unification, the increasing Taiwanese desire for autonomy and the changing US security posture in the Asia Pacific region. In examining these three frames of references, this paper hopes to establish the political and strategic basis underlining why conventional concerns over the Taiwan issue have intensified to the extent of it being identified as a “flashpoint” in the region.

The increasing Chinese desire for unification can be understood most from the aggressive way in which Beijing pursued its one-China policy. This was seen especially in the missile crises of 1995 and 1996. Indeed the 1995 tests sparked a sharp depreciation in the stock market and incited public fear to the extent of people rushing to embassies for visas.[3] As for the 1996 tests, they raised concerns among military experts, who defined the Taiwan Strait to be the world’s “number one flashpoint… where a major armed conflict was likely to occur”.[4] Taken together, the Chinese missile tests were “unprecedented”, and represented the most intensive use of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles for intimidation by any of the nuclear powers.[5] This was especially since the missile tests demonstrated that China had the capability to launch strikes at will in Taiwan, thereby crippling the island’s economic and military power. In addition, the missile tests were accompanied by successive waves of large-scale military exercises, which featured amphibious beachhead landing manoeuvres backed by artillery, aircraft and naval support.[6] These large-scale war games indicated in an overt manner the notion that China was determined to and prepared to launch an amphibious assault on Taiwan in the event that the territory declared independence.

Explaining the reasons behind the strong Chinese actions, these were based on the underlining premise that no Chinese leadership would allow the Taiwanese an opportunity to do what they wanted, especially because of the political weakness this would imply.[7] The military exercises were therefore a clear indication that Beijing would not compromise on issues involving secession and independence, for example in Xinjiang and Tibet, or even over disputed territory, such as in the Spratly Islands.[8] These Chinese actions were hence a strong signal that Beijing would not tolerate any compromise of its sovereignty and territorial rights in any foreseeable situation.

As for the timing of the military tests, this was based on the Chinese perception that the then Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui was attempting to push for independence by internationalising the Taiwan issue during his private visit to Cornell University. This notion, coupled with Lee’s enthusiastic support by the US Congress, implied to China that Taiwan had the tacit support of the US for eventual independence. A dramatic show of force would therefore serve the purpose of warning Taiwan, thereby stopping the territory’s “pragmatic diplomacy” dead in its tracks. It would also have the advantage of influencing the Taiwanese Presidential Elections, threatening the territory into voting instead for a pro-unification candidate. In addition, Chinese policymakers believed that a display of force would dissuade America from embarking upon a costly war both in economic as well as in human terms, perceiving Washington to be wavering in its stance towards Taipei.[9]

By analysing China’s increasing aspirations for unification and its aggression towards Taiwan, it can be argued that tension has been mounting in relations across the Taiwan Strait. It is therefore to no surprise that political and historical analysts point to the build up in Beijing’s military hardware and the country’s strengthening political will, articulating that the situation is precarious, and can be classified as a “flashpoint” in the Asia Pacific.

Another equally important frame of reference is the perspective of an increasing Taiwanese desire for autonomy, a viewpoint that can best be seen from the territory’s increasingly pro-autonomy diplomatic policies. Indeed, political analysts have criticised former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui for sparking Cross-Strait tensions in the 1990s, saying that his 1995 America visit and speech at Cornell University raised tensions across the Taiwan Strait, just like his 1999 definition of China-Taiwan relations based on “special state-to-state” principles.[10] In this light, the presidential election of Chen Shui-bian, from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), also raised fears that Taiwan would launch a bid for independence, thereby igniting a war with China. Although many in the region believe it is unlikely that Taiwan would opt for de jure independence from China, there is still the perception that the island territory would adopt diplomatic offensives that would arouse the anger of the mainland and provoke it towards military action.

Accounting for the Taiwanese push towards greater autonomy, this can be explained through the democratic transition process that began in the late 1980s. Initially, Kuomintang (KMT) policy prescribed that the Taiwanese government was to be considered as the sole legal government of all of China, with Taiwan as part of China. This one-China policy, as laid down by an authoritarian regime, ensured that cross-Strait tensions were a non-issue, especially since there was political and economic segregation due to Cold War pressures.[11] However, the democratic changes promoting freedom of speech and political participation during the late 1980s provided the Taiwanese public with an increased political space to discuss sensitive issues such as what constituted a national identity and what was the long-term future of Taiwan. People were also more willing to engage in discussions on previously taboo subjects such as China-Taiwan relations.[12] This was especially since there were now increased social and economic interaction between the two territories and therefore a need for both parties to question what was the political status of the other party.

As can be seen, the Taiwanese democratic changes paved the way for a shift in societal mindsets concerning Cross-Strait relations, resulting in elected politicians who were more open in advocating an autonomous stance vis-à-vis the mainland. This reflected the manner in which Taiwan embarked on its diplomatic policies, adopting a more pragmatic approach complete with its informal links and international connections. It can therefore be argued that pro-active diplomatic policies from Taiwan could arouse the ire of the mainland, contributing towards military escalation and tension in the Asia Pacific.

The third important frame of reference is the consideration of the Taiwan issue from the point of view of the United States and its changing security posture. Until 1995 Washington had generally pursued a policy of “strategic ambiguity” in terms of its relationships with Beijing and Taipei.[13] The cornerstone of this policy could be seen in America’s simultaneous adherence to both the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and the August Communiqué of 1982. For instance, the Taiwan Relations Act allowed the US to “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means…[as] a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States”. It also committed the country to providing Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character”.[14] However, in signing the August Communiqué Washington promised to reduce and ultimately terminate arms sales to Taipei. The policy of strategic uncertainty was therefore a deliberate effort towards keeping the peace by maintaining the status quo. This was because America had hoped that if its inclinations towards both sides remained unclear, there would be greater unpredictability and hence both China and Taiwan would be hesitant to embark on any overtly polarising policies.

After 1995, this policy of strategic ambiguity was abandoned and America began to express its intentions to assist in the defence of Taiwan should there be any threats or military attacks by China.[15] This was illustrated in the 1995 and 1996 missile crises during which the US sent combat ships to areas near Taiwan, including aircraft carriers Independence and Nimitz, and which analysts say was the largest show of US force against China since the 1950 Korean War.[16]

In explaining the reasons behind America’s shift in security posture, this can be attributed to changing security trends following the end of the Cold War. For instance, the policy of strategic ambiguity was propagated partly due to the warming of Sino-US ties and the attempt by Washington to prise Beijing away from the ambit of Moscow and the Communist bloc. At the same time, America also wanted to preserve its relationship with Taiwan so it could continue to play an important role in Asia. Hence, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act was passed to address concerns regarding the normalisation of ties with China. However, the Act was subverted throughout the 1980s due to protests from Beijing and following the signing of the 1982 August Communiqué. It was only revived in the early 1990s when the US decided to sell high performance F16 fighter planes to Taiwan in 1992 and when the US promised not to stop arms sales to Taiwan in 1994.[17] In the late 1990s, relations with Taiwan took on an additional dimension with the US House of Representatives passing the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act of 1999 to promote ties with the Taiwanese military and to improve the island’s defence vis-à-vis the mainland.

The end of the Cold War accounted significantly towards such an increasingly pro-Taiwan stance. This was especially since the collapse of the USSR left the US as the only superpower in the world, and it no longer needed to compromise its interests to satisfy China. In addition, there was an increasing American perception that China would rise to be the next threat to US security interests. This was principally in the light of weakening Sino-US ties following the 1995 and 1996 missile crises and other incidents including the 1999 NATO bombings of the Chinese Embassy and the 2001 US spyplane incident. Correspondingly, there were also fears that renewed calls for Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) would lock the US and China in a collision course as such a TMD system would result in the formation of an anti-China alliance system involving America’s Pacific allies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.[18] This was especially since there were implicit arrangements for countries such as Australia and Japan to assist the US should it decide to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack.[19]

Hence, it can therefore be argued that the increasingly confrontational way in which America has engaged China can lead to the Taiwan Strait becoming a “flashpoint” of the Asia Pacific region. This is because the US had generally been adopting closer ties with Taiwan, believing the defence of the territory to be integral towards the preservation of its security interests in Asia, especially in the accessing of Taiwan’s ports to preserve the freedom of navigation and the flow of commerce. In addition, Taipei’s economic prosperity was advantageous to the cultivation of Washington’s diplomatic and political ties with Beijing, especially since Taiwan was investing a large amount of capital in business ventures with China, encouraging economic reform and ultimately political liberalisation.[20] Particularly due to growing perceptions that China would emerge to be an American competitor, any military action by Beijing would probably encounter US resistance, an act that could possibly erupt into general war, taking into account the interlocking American system of alliances in the region.

Although there is a general belief that the Taiwan issue is a “flashpoint” of the Asia Pacific region, there are also contradictory reasons to explain why the issue has not yet emerged as such. This can be seen from the deadlock in three sets of relationships associated with the Taiwan Strait – the China-Taiwan relationship, the US-China relationship and the US-Taiwan relationship. A study of each of these three sets of relationships contends that the political and military costs of escalation are vastly outweighed by the comparative ease involved in simply maintaining the status quo.

In examining the Cross-Strait ties between China and Taiwan, the pre-1990 relationship was said to reflect the structural conflict of the Cold War, whereas post-Cold War ties reflected the prisoners’ dilemma in game theory.[21] This was because both sides, when presented with the option of whether to confront or cooperate, would choose rationally to opt for confrontation. On one hand, China’s threat of force would prompt Taiwan to strengthen its self-defence capabilities. On the other hand, Taipei’s refusal to forgo the option of declaring independence would provoke Beijing into refusing to disavow the use of force. Hence both sides’ distrust of the other’s sincerity to cooperate would rationally result in mutual confrontation.[22]

In applying the concept of the prisoners’ dilemma to the question of whether to opt for change or maintain the status quo, it is argued that both sides would prefer to choose the status quo rather than opt for the riskier option of change. This can be seen from the Chinese perspective in that if Beijing were to use military force against Taipei, this would probably elicit a strong US response that would not guarantee the mainland’s conquest of the island. In addition, it can also be argued that in spite of all China’s vehement calls for change, Beijing broadly accepts the status quo largely due to the major benefits already possessed by it, such as a strong international standing and significant economic benefits.[23]

From the Taiwanese standpoint, a declaration of independence would probably provoke military action from China, and even in the unlikely event that Washington chooses to intervene, this might not meet the expectations of Taipei. Furthermore, there were perceptions that the island already possessed de facto independence and de jure calls for independence were not needed. In this respect, it can be argued that neither China nor Taiwan would rationally seek to effect a change in the status quo, as this would not be in the best interests for either party.

Looking at the US-China relationship, this was linked to changes in the global security climate, with the end of the Cold War as the starting point towards increasing strains within the relationship, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the harsh Chinese response to the student democratic movement. However, the prisoners’ dilemma also applies in this situation, with both Washington and Beijing preferring to opt for the status quo rather than upset the precarious balance of power in the Asia Pacific, which would lead to political and military aggression on both sides.

From the viewpoint of the United States, a complete isolation of China through interlocking alliances coupled with an overtly pro-Taiwan stance would push Beijing towards reciprocal political alliances and military endeavours, returning the global strategic climate to one reminiscent of Cold War days.[24] It was to this end that America articulated its “three no’s” policy promising not to support either the concept of “Two Chinas” or that of “One China, One Taiwan”, not to support Taiwanese independence and not to support Taiwan’s membership in international organisations requiring statehood.[25] This was so as to obtain China’s cooperation in maintaining peace and stability in other parts of the world, as well as to collaborate with Beijing on economic development and in managing global issues such as ecological destruction and nuclear proliferation.[26]

When looking at the issue from the Chinese point of view, angering the US over Taiwan could provoke a similar response as experienced during the missile crises of the mid-1990s. Moreover, Beijing would also not want to derail its bid to enter the World Trade Organisation (WTO), nor would it want to affect the success of the 2008 Olympics as in the event of a US boycott. It can thus be reasoned that neither America nor China would attempt to destabilise their existing relationship over alterations to the status quo in Taiwan.

The US-Taiwan relationship had its roots in the Cold War, with the American support of the KMT as an extension of Washington’s general policy at containing the spread of communism.  With the “ping pong diplomacy” of Nixon-Kissinger and the normalisation of US ties with China, the US-Taiwan relationship suffered a freeze, with relations thawing only after the end of the Cold War.

Applying the prisoners’ dilemma to this relationship, it can be argued that both Washington and Taipei would not want to risk the existing character of their relationship, opting instead for maintenance of the status quo. According to Washington, it would not be wise to attempt a formalisation of US-Taiwan relations, or to deepen the relationship between the two sides, especially since Taiwan can be used as a card to pressure both sides of the Taiwan Strait.[27] In addition, policies overly favouring Taipei could have the effect of angering Beijing, igniting political and military repercussions in the mainland such as Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Cornell University partly influenced Beijing’s decision to fire its ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait.

From the perspective of the Taiwanese, a declaration of independence would be tantamount to cutting off American support as well as ending a non-diplomatic yet legally cosy relationship. Such an action would also undermine the success of various Taiwanese efforts to gain membership in international organisations not having the prerequisite of statehood. Moreover, the economic prosperity of Taipei would be too much to risk in exchange for mere de jure independence. It would be more beneficial for Taiwan to apply such prosperity as a source of leverage to maintain US interest in the territory’s survival.[28] Considering these various factors, it is evident that neither America nor Taiwan would rationally attempt to change the status quo, instead promoting policies to maintain it.

In discussing the three sets of relationships associated with the Taiwan Strait, it is evident that none of these three main players would risk pursuing a policy option that severely threatens the political status quo. This is especially the case because the political and military costs to be paid are outweighed significantly by the risks involved. In addition, there is no guarantee that any of these changes might improve the situation, and they could instead worsen the position of the policy initiator. Hence, in a climate embracing rationality, it is unlikely that the Taiwan issue can be considered to be a major “flashpoint”. It is instead likely that the situation across the Taiwan Strait would result in a political and military impasse, promoting stability in the Asia Pacific region.

Considering the improbability of conflict across the Taiwan Strait based on current realistic perceptions, it is not unthinkable to envisage war if any of the three major parties involved pursued a path not entirely bounded by rationality. It is therefore important to consider the possibilities that exist for the US, China and Taiwan, should either of these parties decide to attempt a break from the status quo and pursue policies that could lead to conflict. In the course of breaking away from the status quo, the actions of one party directly affect the reciprocal behaviour of the other two parties. Hence, it is important that analysis focuses on this action-reaction aspect of the US-China-Taiwan triangular relationship.

An American move away from the status quo would be apparent if Washington decided to pursue anti-Chinese policies due to growing strains in the fragile Sino-US relationship. This could include the insistence that the TMD system be extended to Taiwan despite vehement Chinese protests. Alternatively, an aggressive and isolationist Republican policy against Beijing could also change the political status quo, resulting in a reactionary China that would be more hostile to US initiatives. With regards to the US-Taiwan relationship, any policy option by Washington overtly favouring Taipei would gain the fury of Beijing. For instance, this could occur if the Taiwan lobby persuaded Congress to pass laws adopting a stricter adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act, or to increase US military support of Taiwan.[29] In all these instances, Chinese strategists would respond in a more reactive fashion, raising the stakes in the Taiwan Strait leading to increased tension and potentiality for conflict.

Supposing China were to favour change rather than accept the status quo, this would probably be due to declining ties with the US, causing Beijing to adopt more xenophobic policies promoting aggression in the Asia Pacific region. Alternatively, a prolonged Taiwanese refusal to negotiate unification with China could frustrate Beijing to the extent that it chooses to use military force to physically unify the country.[30] Such military actions could involve strategies such as a naval or aerial blockade of Taiwan, or even a full invasion of the island, which would probably be deemed unacceptable in America and consequently elicit strong protests in Washington. This could lead to the possibility that the US might decide to reinforce the Taiwanese, and persuade its allies to do the same, resulting in a global war with possible nuclear overtones, a gloomy prospect indeed for the Asia Pacific region.

A Taiwanese dissatisfaction with the status quo could involve increasing the diplomatic profile of the territory, including attempts to raise the international standing of Taipei beyond a level acceptable by Beijing, for instance insisting on formal ties with the United States. Alternatively, a Taiwanese development of nuclear weapons or declaration of de jure independence would most probably result in military engagement with China, an action that could threaten to destabilise the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific.[31]

As can be seen, armed conflict across the Taiwan Strait is likely to occur if any of the three major parties involved decides to act irrationally and pursue changes unacceptable by the other parties. However, according to the prisoners’ dilemma in game theory, and weighing the risks to be taken against the gains to be achieved, it is unlikely that such an outcome would occur. Hence, a general assumption can be made that conflict in the Taiwan Strait is unlikely because of the undesired consequences that could result in the event that the status quo is rejected.

In conclusion, the Taiwan issue has indeed the potential to become a “flashpoint” of the Asia Pacific region, especially with regards to polarising points of view from the United States, China and Taiwan, which have escalated concerns in the region regarding its characteristic instability. However, in considering the rational choices available to each of these three major players, it can instead be argued that all three parties would choose to preserve the prevailing status quo, rendering any possibility of conflict as minimal due to the resultant political impasse. Hence, although the Taiwan issue has the potential to become a “flashpoint” in the Asia Pacific region, it is not yet at a point to erupt into something significantly destabilising to the security environment of the Asia Pacific.

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