Military Rearmament in Germany

The NATO campaign in Kosovo has brought to the front a critical issue in post-Cold War Germany – the country’s concern over military rearmament. On the 1^st of May 1999, twelve thousand people gathered in a rally to demand an end to the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, the German military’s first combat operation since World War Two.[1] According to US President Bill Clinton, Germany’s support of the NATO campaign was crucial. Only then need the other NATO allies collectively approve any military action against Serbia.[2] Indeed, as Franz-Josef Meiers articulates, the rearmament debate centres on the “insistence” that Germany accept a key role in international security leadership. On the other hand, residual concerns over the country’s military power have resulted in a German “reluctance” to pursue policies contrary to national self defence.[3] In arguing for a more assertive Germany, Meiers suggests that the rearmament issue has raised two fundamental questions: whether Germans are willing to bear new global responsibilities, and whether German allies and partners are prepared to accept the country’s new assertiveness in the light of its historical past.[4] Consequently, this paper will examine the historical roots of the rearmament question, analysing its broader significance towards regional and domestic stability, as well as suggesting a change in attitudes as a possible way to resolve the issue.

After the Second World War, the victorious Allies were faced with the important question of how to deal with the defeated nation of Nazi Germany. At the key Potsdam Conference of 1945, the three powers agreed to a “complete disarmament and demilitarization” of Germany.[5] In addition, Allied fears of a possible German military resurgence led to the country’s consequent division into four occupation zones.

With the polarisation of the world into US and Soviet-led blocs, Germany was divided into East and West Germany. Against the backdrop of the 1948-49 Berlin crisis, the complex issue of German rearmament arose. Walt Rostow argues that an “immense” ground force was needed in West Germany to deter the Soviet Union from attempting any military action against Western Europe.[6] However, West German opinion was divided internally with fears that rearmament could justify Soviet excuses for war or reawaken militant aspirations. Externally, strong opposition came from France with its long-standing animosity with the German nation.[7] Consequently, the plan for rearmament was postponed until a cooling of Franco-German rivalries in 1950. The subsequent creation of the European Steel and Coal Community paved the way for West German admission to NATO in 1955 and its subsequent rearmament later in the year.

After the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the rearmament issue resurfaced due to a de-classification of regional security in purely Cold War terms. However, with the emergence of unified Germany as the third largest economic power in the world, external pressure was on the country to assume a leadership position.[8] Internally however, public perceptions remained deeply adverse to remilitarisation, preferring a “civilian power” policy and adhering to “strict military abstinence”.[9] 

Examining the significance of the rearmament question, it is understandable that the issue has generated such widespread concern. This is especially since the European continent has experienced a certain degree of stability, and a military build-up could ignite old rivalries, or even threaten the unity of the European Union. Consequently, Europeans are circumspect with respect to the danger that remilitarisation could cause towards destabilising the region. Indeed, rearmament can be likened to sharpening the teeth of a tiger that had once caused global military instability. Such rekindling of residual fears is similar to the uproar raised against Japan and its role in peacekeeping and regional security. Domestically, public sentiment is understandably cautious as political and economic stability have brought about a comfortable measure of life, and people are therefore wary about ushering a military-strong Germany in the fear that such a situation could destabilise both the regional and domestic situations.

Consequently, in attempting to resolve the question of remilitarisation, it is essential for attitudes to be changed. Internally, the German public and leaders have to define a new role of conduct that neither “shirks responsibilities” of international leadership, nor revives fears of German power.[10] This shift of attitude is necessary in the wake of the Kosovo bombings, which have changed the nature and extent of Germany’s military involvement. As a result of responsibly defining such a German role, it would then be possible for external attitudes to change, effecting a positive response towards Germany’s new role in the international community.

The above essay was written by Mark Lim Shan-Loong on 3rd February 2000.

Bibliography

Abu-Nasr, Donna, “Germany’s chancellor-elect backs NATO action over Kosovo”, Associated Press [United States of America], 10 October 1998, Online, The Detroit News, Available: http://detnews.com/1998/nation/9810/10/10100085.htm, 27 Jan 2000.

“Kosovo War Overshadows Traditional Labor Day Rallies”, Associated Press [United States of America], 1 May 1999, Online, CNN, Available: http://www.oaza.co.yu/kosovo/strmediji/overshadows.htm, 27 Jan 2000.

Maull, Hanns W., “Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis”, Survival, Vol. 37, No. 4, Winter 1995-96, 99-132.

Meiers, Franz-Josef, “Germany:  The Reluctant Power”, Survival, Vol. 37, No. 3, Autumn 1995, 82-103.

Rostow, Walt W., “The Marshall Plan:  Lessons of the Plan”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1997, Online, Available: http://www.lcsys.com/fayette/history/plan17.htm, 25 Jan 2000.

Rupieper, Hermann-Josef, “After the Cold War:  The United States, Germany, and European Security”, Diplomatic History, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 1992, 262-8.

United States, Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, July 17-August 2, 1945, 1 Aug 1945, A Decade of American Foreign Policy:  Basic Documents, 1941-49, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950. Online, The Avalon Project, Yale University, Available: wysiwyg://143/http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decade17.htm, 25 Jan 2000.