Nuclear Power & Security in South Asia

In May 1998, India and Pakistan shocked the world by carrying out 5 nuclear tests each in rapid succession, reminding the global population that the power to effect mass destruction was not solely limited to the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, and that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of nuclear proliferation. This paper analyses the motivations behind the Indian and Pakistani tests, suggesting that both states went overtly nuclear for reasons of national security, international status and domestic politics. In addition, the paper also argues that the self-declared nuclear power status of both countries will lead to a more stable South Asia only if a proper arms control regime is developed.

Examining the reasons for India’s 1998 nuclear tests, it can be seen that national security and international status played a key role towards the country’s decision to go nuclear, while domestic politics was crucial in determining the timing of the nuclear tests. In terms of national security, India’s nuclear weapon development was driven by its concerns over China.[1] This was especially since the country suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war with Beijing. In addition, the Chinese nuclear explosions in 1964 affirmed Indian desires to deter any possible attack by China.[2] Such fears, although unlikely, have been sparked by a genuine concern that Beijing was encircling New Delhi through its military activities and alliances with Pakistan and Myanmar.[3] This was especially because of American support for China after the Nixon visit and in the post-Cold War Clinton era. Moreover, China’s supplying of Pakistan with nuclear and missile technology closely linked the two traditional Indian foes, both with the capacity to use nuclear weapons.[4] Consequently, the Indian push towards nuclear development was centred heavily on its national security concerns over China and on how to break away from the encirclement of the “new Cold War” that emerged in the wake of competing Sino-Indian nationalism.

India’s search for increased international status also influenced its desire to go nuclear. This can be seen by its position that nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or in the exercise of “equal and legitimate security” for all.[5] The position supported the idea of nuclear weapons as the key indicator of state power and the “currency of influence” operational throughout the world. Hence, India’s political elite felt that it was unfair for the Big 5 Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to admonish New Delhi and yet continue to possess nuclear weapons.[6] In addition, Sino-Indian rivalry prompted New Delhi to desire that it be treated at least as importantly as China, as exemplified by Beijing’s entry into the NWS Club and position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.[7] More importantly, the nuclear tests were a reminder to the international community of India’s political strength, and meant as a message that it was breaking free from the shackles of its colonial past and determined to chart its own destiny.[8] Hence, the determination of India to display its nuclear strength was linked to desires for enhanced international status, as seen from its strong desire to play an important role as a global Great Power and as the hegemon on the South Asian sub-continent.

Although India’s national security concerns and its desire for increased international status drove the country towards nuclear development, domestic politics influenced when the nuclear tests were held. This can be seen from New Delhi’s 24 years of underground nuclear activity since the first explosions in 1974. However, in May 1998 the BJP-led government finally pushed the nuclear button partly because of its pre-election promises. In pursuing a pro-nuclear policy, the BJP promised Indian voters that it would not be dictated by anyone in matters of security and in exercising the nuclear option, to the extent of staking its political life on the delivery of such a promise. If the elected BJP-led government had not undertaken to fulfil its promise, it would have been perceived weak by Indian voters and might not have been able to continue governing the country for a long period of time.[9] Hence, the domestic concerns of the ruling party were essential in the final testing of India’s nuclear bomb.

Similar to India, Pakistan’s reasons for testing the bomb were also linked to issues of national security, international status and domestic politics, although the interplay of these three factors affected the country differently than in India. In terms of national security, Pakistan’s foreign policy and security policy were formulated with the explicit aim of protection against India. This was as a result of a Pakistani desire to prevent India from dictating terms on the subcontinent and posing a threat to Islamabad’s territorial integrity, especially after the 1971 defeat and the independence of Bangladesh, and in view of the long-standing instability in Kashmir. Nuclear capacity was therefore portrayed as the ultimate equaliser against Indian conventional and nuclear might.[10]

In addition, the rise of the nationalist BJP government raised fears of Hindu revivalism, which was coupled with the perceived views of US support for India’s nuclear capability as a means to balance Chinese power.[11] These fears were enhanced by the testing of the Indian bomb in May 1998, seen as “particularly provocative” to Pakistan because it involved the “perfection” of battlefield tactical weapons. Subsequently, Islamabad felt a need to work out a credible response to New Delhi in order to maintain the credibility of its nuclear capability thorough demonstrated nuclear testing.[12]  It can therefore be seen that the national security dimension of the Pakistani tests was related to the country’s limited strategic depth and inferiority to India in terms of conventional forces.[13]

Considering the Pakistani desire for enhanced international status, this can largely be explained by the country’s need to outperform India in the global arena, so it can overcome its geographical constraints as a country always in the shadows of a politically and economically-dominant India.[14] Hence, Islamabad has been consistent in pursuing the removal of perceived asymmetries vis-à-vis New Delhi with regards to nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as in desiring equal treatment with India towards the creation of non-proliferation architecture in the subcontinent.[15] To this end, the international status concerns of Pakistan are in relation to how it is treated vis-à-vis India in the international arena.

Like in India, domestic politics was crucial towards determining when the nuclear tests would be held. This can be seen from the two diverse views present in pre-1998 Pakistan, adopting radically different beliefs about the attitude of India and the foreign policies of the United States.[16] On one hand, there was a pro-bomb group adopting the idea that India was unconditionally hostile and that the US practised discrimination, favouring a pro-active stance with nuclear tests to deter India as well as to assert Pakistani independence from America. On the other hand, there was a pro-restraint group adopting the idea that India was not necessarily hostile and that the US was not necessarily discriminatory in its actions. This group called for a cautious and restrained nuclear policy and pursued the revival of US military and economic aid.[17]

With the Indian nuclear explosion, the pro-bomb lobby gained considerable ground especially because of domestic pressure by opposition leaders, Islamic rightwing groups and the army.[18] Moreover, the Indian threats concerning Kashmir caused many Pakistanis to fear that New Delhi was prepared to link Kashmir to an altered nuclear balance in South Asia, because it did not consider Islamabad’s nuclear weapons to be genuinely effective.[19] This was coupled with the inability of Pakistan to elicit real security guarantees from the US and China if it took a non-nuclear stance.[20] Consequently, the Pakistani decision to go nuclear was clearly a result of these domestic political factors, which pushed the country to overtly declare its nuclear capability.

In conducting the nuclear tests of May 1998, both India and Pakistan sought to demonstrate to the international community that their nuclear capability was a force to be reckoned with. However, in the pursuit of a pro-nuclear policy, both South Asian countries had raised queries regarding the stability of the subcontinent in the wake of their self-declared nuclear power status. Considering the issue, this paper argues that stability in South Asia will be enhanced provided a proper arms control regime is developed.

The argument about whether an overtly nuclear South Asia is stable has its roots in two competing viewpoints regarding the strategic stability of the subcontinent. The first theory, by Thomas Schelling, argues that during crises, NWS face tremendous pressures to pre-emptively destroy their opponent’s nuclear power according to a “use them or lose them” mentality.[21] This premise, involving the “reciprocal fear of surprise attack”, advocates that the South Asian continent has been destabilised by the declaration of nuclear power status in India and Pakistan. The second theory, by McGeorge Bundy, argues that the mere existence of nuclear weapons imposes a high deterrence for the states involved. This idea of “existential deterrence” emerges because of the enormous destructive potential of nuclear power, and the idea that South Asian leaders will factor the fear of escalation into political considerations, choosing to find ways so as not to use their nuclear weapons.[22]

In arguing that South Asia will be a more stable place in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, Bundy’s argument of “existential deterrence” is more credible than Schelling’s “reciprocal fear of surprise attack”. Consider the Schelling model, which argues that there are many “hair-trigger” pressures in South Asia, and that any one of these problems, especially the Kashmiri issue, could be a potential flashpoint for a fourth Indo-Pakistan war, and could result in mass nuclear destruction.[23] However, Schelling’s model is merely a human creation and manifested as part of game theory logic, unlike Bundy’s theory, which had its historical origins in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash and the 1990 Kashmir crisis.[24] In addition, there is the question of why either side would use nuclear weapons if fallout could easily drift back over the attacker’s territory. Moreover, it is also difficult to determine whether it is possible to destroy all of the opponent’s nuclear weapons in a pre-emptive strike.[25] All these reasons suggest that the idea of “existential deterrence” is more credible than “reciprocal fear of surprise attack’, and that South Asia is indeed a more stable place after the self-declaration of nuclear power status in India and Pakistan.

Despite the enhanced strategic stability of the subcontinent in the wake of the 1998 nuclear tests, stability in the region could be affected if a nuclear accident in one state resulted in a reciprocal reaction in its opponent. Hence, it is pertinent for South Asian states to pursue a nuclear doctrine with guidance from the established NWS.[26] To this end, it is crucial for both India and Pakistan to develop an arms control doctrine to effectively control the use of nuclear weapons. This can be in the areas of defining the actual purpose of the nuclear armoury, shaping the nature of the deterrence doctrine, and positioning civilians as the ultimate decision-makers of nuclear power.[27] Hence, by clearly defining the nature of the nuclear doctrine and in establishing clear arms control guidelines, both India and Pakistan would be able to integrate nuclear weapons into their general defence structures, enforcing deterrence in a doctrinal-military sense.[28] Consequently, both countries would be able to institutionalise their defence posture in a manner similar to the American and Soviet powers during the Cold War, enhancing the stability of South Asia.

In conclusion, the May 1998 nuclear explosions of India and Pakistan addressed the inherent issues of national security, international status and domestic politics in both countries, resulting in their declaration as nuclear powers. By pursuing their nuclear aspirations, both India and Pakistan also altered significantly the strategic climate in South Asia, resulting in a temporary state of instability, underscored by the possibility of nuclear accidents and the possible devastation of the region. Consequently, it is only by defining an effective arms control doctrine that more permanent stability can be re-introduced to South Asia, regulating the use of nuclear weapons and integrating them into the strategic climate of the region.

The above essay was written by Mark Lim Shan-Loong on 16th March 2001.

Bibliography

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Hagerty, Devin T., “South Asia’s Big Bangs:  Causes, Consequences, and Prospects”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1999, 19-29.

Malik, Mohan, “Nuclear Proliferation in Asia:  The China Factor”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1999, 31-41.

Raman, B., Pakistan’s Post-Chagai Nuclear Diplomacy:  An analysis, 2 January 1999, Online, South Asia Analysis Group, Available: http://www.saag.org/papers/paper29.html, 20 Jan 2001.

Singh, Jaswant, “Against Nuclear Apartheid”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998, 41-52.

United States, US Nonproliferation Concerns, March 2000, Online, Department of State, Available: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/sa/0003_nonpro.html, 20 Jan 2001.

Yasmeen, Samina, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests:  Domestic Debate and International Determinants”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1999, 43-56.