Singapore 21 & Nation Building
In
August 1997, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong launched the Singapore 21 Committee
with the aim of strengthening the “heartware” of the Republic in the 21st
Century. This comprised of five subject committees that were formed to study the
pertinent issues Singaporeans would have to face in the building of such a new
society during the 21st Century. Some 6,000 Singaporeans from all walks of life
were then consulted for the time span of one year in order to understand their
concerns and aspirations. At the end of this period, a report was published
consolidating the results of this study. It served as the basis for the
Singapore 21 Vision as adopted by the Republic.[1]
By examining this Vision, the essay seeks to understand the nation-building
process in Singapore as well as the role that Singapore 21 plays in the process.
It argues that Singapore 21 functions as part of the ideological layering of
nation-building and also serves to concretise the government’s approach
towards this process. Hence, the essay will first discuss the aims and
objectives of the nation-building process before the launch of Singapore 21,
subsequently evaluating the role of Singapore 21 in the overall nation-building
process.
A second consideration in the construction of Singapore’s
national identity is the issue of language. This is again a function of the
demography of Singapore, with different people from different ethnic groups
speaking different languages. Given that government policies encouraging
nation-building have to be communicated to the population before such a nation
can be built, Singapore’s leaders have relied heavily on education and
language instruction to convey nationalistic values to its citizens. It was with
this rationale that the bilingualism policy was formulated, based on the
assumption that a bilingual person would be able to communicate and interact not
only with his or her own community, but also with members of another linguistic
group, thereby fostering racial harmony and integration.[11]
In this respect, the use of English as the lingua franca of everyday life
has served as a common denominator for many young Singaporeans, given that a
growing number of these young people are becoming more fluent in English than
their respective dialects.[12]
In the construction of Singapore’s national
identity, a fourth consideration can be recognised in terms of the
individual’s perception of belonging. This is especially significant because
the viability of the nation-state is dependent on the degree to which
individuals identify with the state. Accordingly, such an identification with
the state is conditioned by the extent to which the government is willing to and
prepared to accommodate the interests of constituent groups, while
simultaneously balancing such interests against the capacity to deliver a
minimum standard of living, economic welfare and security.[16]
To this end, the Singapore government has attempted to propagate a set of Shared
Values to “evolve
and anchor a Singaporean identity” by incorporating various elements of the
country’s cultural heritage, attitudes and values.[17]
Moreover, there was also the notion that by identifying common key values, all
communities would gradually develop more “distinctively Singaporean
characteristics” over time.[18]
The
above essay was written by Mark Lim Shan-Loong on 8 April 2002.
Bibliography
Chan, Heng Chee, Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: The Singapore Case, Occasional Paper No.
3, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1971.
Chiew, Seen Kong, “Nation-Building in Singapore:
A Historical Perspective”, In
Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon S. T. Quah, Singapore: Institute of
Policy Studies, 1990, 6-23.
Chua, Beng-Huat, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
Clammer, John, “Deconstructing Values:
The Establishment of a National Ideology and its Implications for
Singapore’s Political Future”, Singapore Changes Guard: Social,
Political and Economic Directions in the 1990s, ed. Garry Rodan, Australia: Longman Cheshire, 1993, 34-51.
George, Cherian, Singapore: The
Air-Conditioned Nation, Singapore: Landmark Books, 2000.
Goh, Chok Tong, Prime Minister, “Our Singapore Our
Best Home”, Speech at the Launch of the Singapore 21 Vision, 24 April 1999.
---, “Singapore 21 – A New Vision for a New
Era”, Speech during the Debate on the President’s Address in Parliament, 5
June 1997.
---, “The Singapore Tribe”, Speech during the
Singapore 21 Debate in Parliament, 5 May 1999.
Hill, Michael and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building in Singapore, London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
Kwok, Kian Woon and Mariam Ali, “Cultivating
Citizenship and National Identity”, Singapore:
Re-Engineering Success, eds. Arun Mahizhnan and Lee Tsao
Yuan, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Oxford University Press,
1998, 112-22.
Quah, Jon S. T., “Government Policies and
Nation-Building”, In
Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon S. T. Quah, Singapore: Institute of
Policy Studies, 1990, 45-65.
Singapore,
Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore
2001, 2001.
---,
Prime Minister's
Office, Singapore
21: Together, We Make the
Difference, 1999.
---,
Shared Values, White Paper. 2 Jan 1991.
Suryadinata, Leo, “National Ideology and Nation-Building in
Multi-ethnic States: Lessons from
Other Countries”, In
Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon S. T.
Quah, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990, 24-44.
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Keng Yam Tony, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Speech at the Launch
of 35 Years Of National Service
Commemoration, 6 March 2002.
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Fusion”, Coercion and Governance: The
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001,
276-93.
[1] Singapore, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore 21: Together, We Make the Difference, 1999, Preface.
[2] Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building in Singapore, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 18. It must be noted that the idea of a nation did not exist even in the case of Indonesia, where political elites waged war against the colonial power. This concept was only created by the new independent state, which consisted of the same territorial boundaries of its colonial predecessor, and still had to grapple with conflicting loyalties across ethnic groups and geographical regions.
[3] Ibid., p. 19.
[4]
Chan Heng Chee, Nation-Building in
Southeast Asia: The Singapore
Case,
Occasional Paper No. 3, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
1971, pp. 1-2.
[5] Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building in Singapore, p. 22.
[6] Jon S. T Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building”, In Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon S. T. Quah, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990, p. 47.
[7] Kwok Kian Woon and Mariam Ali, “Cultivating Citizenship and National Identity”, Singapore: Re-Engineering Success, eds. Arun Mahizhnan and Lee Tsao Yuan, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 113.
[8] Singapore, Ministry of Information and the Arts, Singapore 2001, (2001), p. 49. The figures are for the year 2000.
[9] Jon S. T Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building”, pp. 49-51. Note that from 1st March 1989, each neighbourhood was to have a limit of 84% Chinese residents, 22% Malay residents and 10% Indian and other residents. The limit per block was set at 87% for Chinese residents, 25% for Malay residents and 13% for Indian and other residents.
[10] Chiew Seen Kong, “Nation-Building in Singapore: A Historical Perspective”, In Search of Singapore’s National Values, ed. Jon S. T. Quah, Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1990, pp. 16-7. Chiew notes that the difference between young Singaporeans and their older parents and grandparents stem from the different experiences and habits of both parties.
[11] Jon S. T Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building”, p. 56.
[12] The government’s emphasis on a “mother tongue” is more controversial, with minority Singaporeans questioning the utility of the Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools and seeing them as part of a trend towards ethnic polarisation. See Cherian George, Singapore: The Air-Conditioned Nation, Singapore: Landmark Books, 2000, pp. 76-7. A similar argument can be made regarding the Speak Mandarin Campaign regularly organised by the government, which has alienated the non-Chinese and increased the ethnic consciousness of all Singaporeans as a result. See Jon S. T Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building”, p. 57.
[13] Cited in Jon S. T Quah, “Government Policies and Nation-Building”, p. 54.
[14] S. Jayakumar, cited in Ibid.
[15] Ibid., p. 55.
[16] Michael Hill and Lian Kwen Fee, The Politics of Nation Building in Singapore, p. 27.
[17] Singapore, Shared Values, White Paper. 2 Jan 1991, p. 1.
[18] Ibid., pp. 2-3.
[19] Tan Tai Yong, “Singapore: Civil-Military Fusion”, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 285-6.
[20]
Tony Tan Keng Yam, Speech at the Launch of 35
Years Of National Service Commemoration, 6 March 2002.
[21] Goh Chok Tong, “Singapore 21 – A New Vision for a New Era”, Speech during the Debate on the President’s Address in Parliament, 5 June 1997.
[22] Goh, Chok Tong, “Our Singapore Our Best Home”, Speech at the Launch of the Singapore 21 Vision, 24 April 1999.
[23] Singapore, Prime Minister's Office, Singapore 21: Together, We Make the Difference, 1999, pp. 9-10.
[24] Ibid., p. 15.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Goh, Chok Tong, “Our Singapore Our Best Home”, Speech at the Launch of the Singapore 21 Vision, 24 April 1999.
[27] Cited in Goh Chok Tong, “The Singapore Tribe”, Speech during the Singapore 21 Debate in Parliament, 5 May 1999.