Singapore 21 & Nation Building

In August 1997, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong launched the Singapore 21 Committee with the aim of strengthening the “heartware” of the Republic in the 21st Century. This comprised of five subject committees that were formed to study the pertinent issues Singaporeans would have to face in the building of such a new society during the 21st Century. Some 6,000 Singaporeans from all walks of life were then consulted for the time span of one year in order to understand their concerns and aspirations. At the end of this period, a report was published consolidating the results of this study. It served as the basis for the Singapore 21 Vision as adopted by the Republic.[1] By examining this Vision, the essay seeks to understand the nation-building process in Singapore as well as the role that Singapore 21 plays in the process. It argues that Singapore 21 functions as part of the ideological layering of nation-building and also serves to concretise the government’s approach towards this process. Hence, the essay will first discuss the aims and objectives of the nation-building process before the launch of Singapore 21, subsequently evaluating the role of Singapore 21 in the overall nation-building process.

  The Southeast Asian approach towards nation-building was coloured by its decolonisation experience. Due to the idea that Southeast Asian states were generally created out of territories under colonial administration, the formation of such states did not instil in their populations an acute sense of nationhood as might have been experienced in revolutionary-democratic states that were formed as the product of a popular uprising.[2] It was therefore the task of postcolonial elites to engineer a sense of nationalism among their populations, which marked the beginning of their long and arduous journey along the road towards nation-building.

  In a similar manner, the Singapore approach towards nation-building began in the wake of the Republic’s separation from Malaysia. The political leaders in the country were then faced with the task of shedding Singapore’s pre-independence identity and replacing it with a viable alternative. In Southeast Asia, two options were available. One alternative was to resort to a “regressive” identity by appealing to the “glorious past” and reviving a long-standing cultural tradition. The other option was to build a “progressive” identity by establishing a society based on primordial loyalties.[3] In the Singapore case, both alternatives were unviable as the country did not have a “glorious past” to resort to; neither was it feasible to build a society based on the primordial loyalties of the dominant ethnic Chinese group, as this would be too closely associated with the spectre of communism threatening to overpower the region.

  To address this dilemma, Singapore’s strategy towards nation-building was instead centred on the establishment of a legitimate authority and the creation of a national identity. This embodied the need for effective and efficient government, as well as the necessity of manipulating, adapting and creating new “national” values.[4] To this end, the Singapore leadership embarked on the construction of a nation in terms of the civic-instrumental as well as the cultural-symbolic dimensions of the process. While the civic-instrumental aspects of nation-building are expressed in terms of the material and utilitarian concerns of administration and resource control, the cultural-symbolic dimensions entail the development of a collective identity that would enable individuals to associate with the state.[5] Both aspects of nation-building are equally important and an absence of either process would result in an incomplete attempt at creating a nation. For instance, if a particular government only emphasised the civic-instrumental dimension, this would result in an affluent society but with its citizens possessing no sense of belonging to the country. Conversely, by solely highlighting the cultural-symbolic aspect, there would be the development of a closely-knit society, but the citizens of the country would not have the economic and therefore the military capability to defend themselves.

  Consider the civic-instrumental dimension of nation-building. This can be observed in Singapore’s industrialisation drive during the 1960s to the 1980s. For instance, the government paved the way for industrialisation in 1959 by enacting legislation like the Pioneer Industries Ordnance and the Industrial Expansion Ordnance. These laws were designed to attract foreign investment in the manufacturing industries because of the substantial tax concessions offered. In addition, the first State of Singapore Development Plan was launched for the 1961 to 1964 period. This was followed by the Employment Act of 1968, which enforced the streamlining and standardisation of minimum terms and conditions of work for all categories of employees. It consequently facilitated a more attractive industrial environment for foreign investment, making the climate equally desirable for both blue-collar and white-collar work.[6]

  In the construction of the civic-instrumental aspect of nation-building, Singapore’s leaders were of the belief that a developmentalist approach was politically expedient and necessary to meet the demands for survival in the newly-independent Republic. This was because the act of developing a strong economy served as the infrastructural basis for the eventual construction of a nation.[7] Accordingly, economic power served to safeguard the political viability of Singapore and provided the framework for the cultural-symbolic aspects of nation-building to be explored.

  The cultural-symbolic aspects of nation-building can be examined by studying the issues affecting the creation of a national identity in Singapore, as reflected in the areas of ethnicity, language, religion and belonging. This is important given the diverse nature of Singapore’s population and the notion that the country is made up of immigrant people who do not possess any shared history or common ancestry, and are consequently different in terms of ethnicity, language and religion.

  Firstly, the concept of ethnicity has been a key consideration in the construction of Singapore’s national identity. This is because the demographic characteristics of the Republic lies fundamentally in its ethnically diverse but predominantly Chinese population, which comprises about 2.51 million people, or 77% of the resident population.[8] This brings about difficulties in maintaining social cohesion among the different ethnic groups. To this end, the Singapore government has embarked on a policy of “multiculturalism” as reflected in the embracing of different ethnic cultures within a larger Singapore “nation”. One government policy that directly addresses ethnicity-related issues is the 1989 policy on public housing, which had the intention of curbing the formation of racial enclaves in housing estates by stipulating limits on the proportion of residents within these estates.[9]

  By formulating such ethnicity-related policies, the Singapore government attempts to address the multiethnic nature of the country by presenting the idea that each ethnic culture is still recognisable, although the boundaries between the cultures have become blurred. For example, young Chinese Singaporeans are still recognisable culturally as “Chinese”, but also recognisably different from their parents and grandparents culturally, as the latter are considered to be “very Chinese”. This is a function of the long process of cultural fusion that is evolving the nature of Singapore society.[10]

A second consideration in the construction of Singapore’s national identity is the issue of language. This is again a function of the demography of Singapore, with different people from different ethnic groups speaking different languages. Given that government policies encouraging nation-building have to be communicated to the population before such a nation can be built, Singapore’s leaders have relied heavily on education and language instruction to convey nationalistic values to its citizens. It was with this rationale that the bilingualism policy was formulated, based on the assumption that a bilingual person would be able to communicate and interact not only with his or her own community, but also with members of another linguistic group, thereby fostering racial harmony and integration.[11] In this respect, the use of English as the lingua franca of everyday life has served as a common denominator for many young Singaporeans, given that a growing number of these young people are becoming more fluent in English than their respective dialects.[12]

  Thirdly, religion has been an important consideration in the construction of Singapore’s national identity. This can be seen especially in terms of the diverse religious beliefs of the population as reflected in the demography of the country. It was on this basis that the government implemented the Religious Knowledge Programme in 1984; to “reinforce the moral values of [the] children and provide them with a moral compass for life”, as articulated by the then Minister of State for Education Dr Tay Eng Soon.[13] In addition, religion was also seen to benefit nation-building as it was believed to promote the maintenance of cultural traditions and family togetherness.[14]

  However, after a time period of six years, the Religious Knowledge Programme was scrapped in 1990 due to fears that the teaching of religious knowledge had led to a “heightened consciousness of religious differences and a new fervour in the propagation of religious beliefs”.[15] The Programme was later replaced with the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act of 1990, which hoped to foster harmony among the various religious groups through the promotion of religious tolerance.  

    In the construction of Singapore’s national identity, a fourth consideration can be recognised in terms of the individual’s perception of belonging. This is especially significant because the viability of the nation-state is dependent on the degree to which individuals identify with the state. Accordingly, such an identification with the state is conditioned by the extent to which the government is willing to and prepared to accommodate the interests of constituent groups, while simultaneously balancing such interests against the capacity to deliver a minimum standard of living, economic welfare and security.[16] To this end, the Singapore government has attempted to propagate a set of Shared Values to “evolve and anchor a Singaporean identity” by incorporating various elements of the country’s cultural heritage, attitudes and values.[17] Moreover, there was also the notion that by identifying common key values, all communities would gradually develop more “distinctively Singaporean characteristics” over time.[18]

            In addition to the cultivation of national values, there was also the belief that belonging implied an inherent characteristic of citizen responsibility to the state. This was expressed in the ideas of Total Defence and National Service. For the policy of Total Defence, it was formulated in 1984 on the basis that Singapore can survive a war only if its entire society is prepared and ready for defence, rather than resting the responsibility solely on the military. This is because in the event of war, all sectors of society will be affected and therefore it is expected that all citizens should contribute to the war effort.[19]

          National Service (NS), a key element of Total Defence, is another policy that contributes towards nation-building because of the idea that NS “fosters and engenders among [the] people a continued commitment… to the defence of [their] common home”. The policy also serves as a “rite of passage that bonds Singaporeans of each cohort to serve together and to defend Singapore against any aggression”.[20]

  As can be seen, the nation-building process before the launch of the Singapore 21 Vision was an extensive process involving both the civic-instrumental as well as the cultural-symbolic aspects of nation-building. Considering that the nation-building project before the launch of Singapore 21 was largely geared towards a positive direction,  it is therefore important to understand the rationale behind the launch of the Vision and how it has affected the overall nation-building process.

  In a speech to Parliament in 1997, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong cited a MasterCard survey highlighting that 1 in 5 Singaporeans had expressed a desire to emigrate despite the country’s economic successes. He noted that such results were shocking and that his government was establishing as a priority the need to deepen Singaporeans’ sense of belonging to the country. As a result, the Prime Minister felt a need to launch a new vision for Singapore, one that would progress beyond material achievements and establish a society with people at its very centre.[21]

  In order to understand the role of Singapore 21 in the nation-building process, it is first important to study the utility of Singapore 21 as a national vision. In this respect, Singapore 21 espouses five key ideas: that every Singaporean matters to society, that strong families are the foundation for building a strong society, that Singapore should be a cosmopolitan city with opportunities for all, that every individual should share a “Singapore Heartbeat” and be emotionally rooted to the country, and that citizens should take the initiative to impact society.[22]

  In addition, the role of Singapore 21 as a national vision can be observed in that it serves to highlight the direction of the Republic in the 21^st Century. This is due to the numerous challenges that the country has to undertake, including the idea of a knowledge-based economy with countries linked to each other via fast-growing information technology, the concept of a “borderless world” with highly mobile citizens, and changes in the population in terms of an increasing elderly population and increasing demands among the young.[23] However, it must be noted that Singapore 21 does not attempt to serve as a “blueprint” for the 21^st century, but merely provide “broad strokes” of a future for Singapore.[24] Consequently, it can be argued that as a policy, Singapore 21 aspires to address concerns in the cultural-symbolic dimension of nation-building.

  Functionally, Singapore 21 differs from the previous nation-building initiatives in the sense that it attempts to concretise the act of nation-building, as reflected in the recommendations and conclusions of its report which provides a comprehensive list on what the individual, society and government can do to further the process of nation-building. However, the Singapore 21 report does not provide a detailed plan, nor does it spell out targets or deadlines to be met.[25] In this manner, Singapore 21 functions more as a checklist for future action. This is in contrast to previous nation-building initiatives which served more as policies with a clear timeframe and course of action.

  Another difference between Singapore 21 and other nation-building efforts is that the former is not an official vision of the government, although it was spear-headed by government officials. The plan was formulated after consultations with 6,000 Singaporeans from all walks of life, reflecting a  diversity of viewpoints. In addition, there is no one government agency or civic body responsible for implementing it.[26] This implies that Singapore 21 was meant to be a vision formulated on the behalf of all Singaporeans, a point that is a sharp contrast to other nation-building initiatives, which were largely formulated by the government for their implementation as public policy. In this sense, the articulation of Singapore 21 in itself marks a departure from the Singapore leadership’s top-down approach towards nation-building. It attempts to yield the impetus for nation-building into the hands of the individual and the society. This is, in itself, an endeavour to create a sense of belonging in the citizens of the country and to instil in them a desire for nationalism.

  Given that Singapore 21 does not have a stated target or deadline to be met, one might argue that there is no way to measure the effectiveness of this Vision. Furthermore, it can also be argued that because the recommendations of the plan seem to be too vague, it might not be entirely feasible to gauge the effectiveness of the plan. However, the utility of Singapore 21 lies in its significance as part of the overall process of nation-building. This is attributed to the notion that nation-building is a continuous process that can never be finished. Consequently, each step of the nation-building process serves as an ideological layer. This is also the attitude adopted by the Singapore government, which believes that Singapore is not yet a nation according to the definition of Rupert Emerson. The Harvard Professor had defined a nation as a “single people, traditionally fixed on a well-defined territory, speaking the same language... possessing a distinctive culture, and shaped to a common mould by many generations of shared historical experience”.[27]

The above essay was written by Mark Lim Shan-Loong on 8 April 2002.