"Shared Values" & their role in Singapore’s evolving ideological framework

If the present generation does not guide new generations… who knows what new values they will pick up. They may inadvertently lose their bearings, or jettison values which have underpinned Singapore’s success. 

- 1991 White Paper on Shared Values[1]

Introduction

The Shared Values concept was first mooted in October 1988 by then First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. Its aim was to “evolve and anchor a Singaporean identity” by incorporating various elements of the country’s cultural heritage, attitudes and values.[2] By 1991, a White Paper was issued and the Shared Values were established as Singapore’s National Ideology. Why did the government see the need for such an ideology, and what role does it play in the country’s evolving ideological framework?

The Need for “Shared Values”

Since independence, Singapore adopted an “ideology of pragmatism” to cope with its survival as a newly-formed state. This entailed the embrace of economic goals, with an emphasis on employment and infrastructure.[3] Such pragmatism, said to be one of “means-end calculation”, was the mechanism through which citizens were made to identify with the economic successes of the state.[4]

By the late 1970s, most of the population’s basic needs had already been fulfilled. Alarming increases in crime, drug-abuse, abortion and other social issues, had then highlighted the need for a set of core values to guard against this “moral crisis” identified as “Westernisation”.[5] A Moral Education programme based on Asian Values was consequently launched in 1979, with the government promoting bilingualism and the use of mother tongue in order to “[blend] the best of the East and of the West”.[6] In addition, Religious Knowledge became a compulsory subject for upper secondary students in 1984. This was due to the belief that religious studies help to “reinforce” the teaching of moral values.[7]

By the late 1980s, fears of religious revivalism caused the government to reverse its stand on religious studies. It scrapped the Religious Knowledge programme, putting in its place the 1990 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. In addition, a secularised “civil religion” was sought after to serve as a source of shared national values. This resulted in the Shared Values White Paper of 1991.[8]

Purpose of the “Shared Values”

In presenting the White Paper, the Singapore government expressed concern over the lack of a “common unique culture” to bind its citizens together. It argued that a coherent Singaporean identity had not yet “gelled”, and unless checked, would result in society falling victim to a changing external climate. There was therefore a need to identify common key values, in the hope that all communities would gradually develop more “distinctively Singaporean characteristics” over time.[9]  Consequently, the document emphasised the nation and community in three out of its five values, with one value highlighting the role of the family and the last one centred on the individual. It also stressed the secularity of the state and its religious neutrality. In addition, the Paper claimed apolitical goals so as not to detract from its key focus on the individual-society relationship.[10]   

Significance of the “Shared Values”

As a document promoting national identity, the Shared Values have attempted to draw on the “essence” of various ethnic and religious groups in Singapore, in order to create a core of “national” values.[11] This approach is retrospective, as the idea of a Singapore nation had to be constructed only after the formation of the Singapore state in 1965.[12] In addition, belonging to a nation involves bonds both among the people and between the government and the people.[13] Consequently, the Paper attempts to forge such bonds only in 1991, about 30 years after the birth of a “Singaporean national identity”.

In the opinion of John Clammer, the White Paper recommends an ideology that promotes statism rather than nationalism. This is emphasised through its lack of a “national myth” – the idea of a struggle or war of independence to sustain such calls for nationalism.[14] Instead, Clammer notes that the document highlights a hidden “patriarchal” political agenda on the part of the government to pre-empt social change and direct it in “suitable” directions.[15] He also highlights “Confucian and conservative” elements represented by a “counter-modernisation” form of ideology.[16] This belief is based on “regressive” tendencies associated with the revival of traditions such as Asian values.[17] As both of these intentions are based on the leadership’s pragmatic stance, it can be argued that the Shared Values have served to reinforce an ideology of pragmatism rather than nationalism.

Shared Values and Singapore’s Ideological Framework

Considering the significance of the Shared Values in enforcing pragmatism, it is important to examine how these values fit into the country’s evolving ideological framework. As outlined earlier, Singapore’s ideological history has been shaped largely by changing societal needs. For instance, the “moral crisis” of the 1970s required a set of values to rectify various societal problems. The ideological landscape has also been peppered with government attempts to correct the loopholes caused by previous policies. This can be exemplified by the 1990 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act to curb the spread of religious revivalism encouraged by the compulsory study of Religious Knowledge. 

The Shared Values project is no exception to this ideological framework. Although this concept highlights the importance of the family as a “basic unit of society”, it does not fully address family-related issues.[18] Within three years of the Paper’s presentation, there was already a rising concern over the health of the family as a “central institution” in society. This was raised by fears over the “declining morality” characterised by increasing nonchalance over sexual morals and marriage.[19] Rising disputes between men and women, and between parents and children also caused Minister Without Portfolio Lim Boon Heng to warn against a societal “breakdown of the family”.[20] It was in this light that the Singapore Family Values were launched in 1995 to strengthen the role of the family. Consequently, it can be argued that the Family Values were introduced to address the inadequacy of the Shared Values in upholding the family.

An alternative approach to the argument would be to raise the issue of ideological layering, that the Family Values highlight and supplement the importance of the Shared Values. This can be rationalised by saying that the Family Values came into being because the Shared Values espouse ideas such as the “family as the basic unit of society” and “consensus instead of contention”. As can be seen, both instances highlight the role of the Shared Values in Singapore’s ideological framework, although from two different perspectives.

Suppose the Shared Values are a means of nation-building, as propagated by the government. How then do these values fit into the country’s ideological framework? Consider the leadership’s various approaches to nation building in recent years, like the idea of a “Singapore Dream”, the notion that Singapore is not perfect, but that “we the Singaporeans” can make it as “near perfect” as possible.[21] Such ideals are also upheld in the Singapore 21 proposal, which calls for a “love for the country… [and] a sense of community and nationhood", termed by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong as the “heartware” of Singapore.[22]

These nation-building efforts highlight the leadership’s desire to seek out a “rootedness” in the Singapore nation, so as not to be severely affected by crises such as the Asian economic meltdown, which test the country’s social cohesion and unity.[23] The Shared Values have likewise sought to develop such a Singapore identity and have served as the basis for the formulation of nationalistic efforts. As Chua Beng-Huat argues, such an emphasis highlights a “communitarian” approach which has breached the “ideological threshold” of survivalism and pragmatism.[24]

Towards Ideological Consensus

Ideological consensus, as outlined by Chua, designates a condition in which the ruling group’s ideas are loosely accepted and reproduced by the governed as part of their “natural reality of everyday life”.[25] When considered in this light, the success of the Shared Values is determined by its ability to inculcate a communitarian ideology accepted by all, which in turn legitimises ideological consensus. This idea is furthered by Clammer, who states that the Shared Values concept is part of the on-going and evolving governmental attempt to reconcile its ideas and “real reality” as one and the same. This, he claims, is the main ideological work of the ruling party since it came to power.[26]

According to Chua Beng-Huat, the Shared Values ideology does not possess any legal or constitutional power. Although the document was accepted by Parliament in 1992, what has been accepted is not specifically defined.[27] It is therefore difficult for the White Paper to define a set of ideas for the populace to accept and reproduce. This presents a difficulty in the discussion of whether the Shared Values can bring about greater ideological consensus.

Generally, however, Singaporeans are supportive of the ruling party’s ideas. This can be seen from its 1997 General Elections’ increase in popular support, during which the party’s percentage of popular vote rose to 63.5%, up from 59.3% in 1991. In addition, there was also a lack of vehement protests despite the introduction of wage cuts and other tight governmental measures caused by the regional downturn. This highlighted an acceptance of the idea that by collectively making a sacrifice and taking a cut in Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions, the economy will recover speedily.[28]

On the other hand, there is the argument that not all of the ruling party ideas are accepted by the population. Take for instance the debate on civil society. In a speech commenting on the relationship between the state and society, then Acting Minister for Information and the Arts George Yeo highlighted the idea of a “Singapore soul”. He argued that when people collectively struggle together, a group identity is developed and a soul is created.[29] This results in a need for both government-created as well as non-state institutions to strengthen the “soul”. However, in the leadership’s opinion, non-state institutions should play a non-political, “civic society” role. This contradicts with the desire of some of these institutions, such as the Association of Women in Action and Research (AWARE), which aspire to play a more “civil society” role, involving greater changes in the political landscape so as to improve societal wellbeing.

More recently, government proposals to foster a Chinese elite have come under fire by members of the minority community. This had been fuelled by a desire to impart “necessary” aspects of Chinese culture and traditions to the young, which would enable them to serve as effective “transmitters” of culture to the next generation.[30] Although the approach is in line with the Shared Values’ intention of retaining culturally-important values, it does not arouse greater ideological consensus, instead raising concern among the minority communities regarding how the policy will impact multi-racialism and equality of opportunities.[31]

Conclusion

As can be seen from the differing instances, the Shared Values have attained limited success in generating greater ideological consensus. In addition, its desire to cultivate such consensus has instead highlighted an inherent irony. This is because the Shared Values attempt to cultivate a national identity resulting from a government-initiated document presented to Parliament. However, as emphasised by Kwok Kian Woon and Mariam Ali, national identity and nationhood are not principles that can be “mandated and managed from the top”. Instead, the nation is an “imagined reality” that transcends institutions such as government and civil society. Consequently, the citizen creates the nation. [32]  It is in this vein that the Shared Values cannot achieve ideological consensus – that their very existence contradicts the cultivation of a national identity. 

The above essay was written by Mark Lim Shan-Loong on the 26th March 1999.

Bibliography

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