The American Involvement in Vietnam

 

 

Vietnam is still with us. It has created doubts about American judgement, about American power – not only at home, but throughout the world… So we paid an exorbitant price for the decisions that were made in good faith and for good purpose.

– Henry Kissinger [1]

 

The United States’ involvement in Vietnam has been remembered by many as one in which the costs outweighed the gains. Indeed the loss of more than fifty-eight thousand lives far away from home had left a deep impact in the minds of many Americans even up to today. Moreover, as Stanley Karnow saw it, the war in Vietnam was in human terms a “war that nobody won – a struggle between victims.”[2] Considering the tremendous significance of the Vietnam Wars, it is therefore important to understand why the nation of America had decided to involve itself in the affairs of a foreign country so geographically removed from home.

 

In his August 1964 televised address to the nation, then President Lyndon B. Johnson acknowledged America’s “solemn responsibility” to order limited military action by its “vast and awesome” forces.[3] Indeed the Gulf of Tonkin incidents characterised Johnson’s subsequent actions, and have been seen by many Americans as the beginning of their own Vietnam War, as these incidents set the tone for the large-scale deployment of US troops on Vietnam soil.[4] However, in examining the reasons behind American involvement in Vietnam, four major considerations have to be made. These are: the importance of Southeast Asia as a region, the anticommunist motivation for the war, the domestic situation in America, and the ideas that promote US credibility and prestige in Vietnam. 

 

In discussing the importance of Southeast Asia to the United States, Robert Blum asserts that an active American policy towards the region arose out its “failed” efforts in China. With the “loss” of Beijing to the communists in 1949, the Truman administration was under heavy domestic fire from its opponents, and promoted a “strong Southeast Asian policy” to divert domestic attention away from China.[5] However, this policy merely increased the significance of Southeast Asia to the Americans, and did not change the perception of the region as a key component of US foreign policy.

 

Consider why Southeast Asia was so significant. Firstly, it provided raw materials and markets for the US economic system.[6] This was essential because the region contributed directly towards rebuilding the war-savaged Japanese and Western European industrial economies, which were in turn vital to the US economic system.[7] As outlined by Thomas McCormick, Europe’s financial-economic situation was dependent on the region’s natural resources, such as rubber, tin and petroleum. In addition, the US National Security Council, in NSC 61, formally stated that Southeast Asia was a “principal trading [area]” to assist in Japan’s economic recovery.[8] Consequently, the economic importance of Southeast Asia was in relation to its role in the capitalist economic system, of which the United States was a major player.

 

Secondly, Southeast Asia was important because of its geo-strategic significance to America. As outlined in a 1951 National Security Council document, US control of the region would result in its securing of the Pacific off-shore islands from Japan to New Zealand. On the contrary, if Southeast Asia was in enemy hands, Japan would be in a “dangerously vulnerable” position, which would threaten the entire security position of the United States in the Pacific.[9] In addition, enemy control of the region would deny America the use of direct air and sea routes between Australia and the Middle East and between the US and India, affecting the country’s security position and effectiveness.[10]

 

Anticommunist sentiments in America were a key factor explaining its involvement in Vietnam. Firstly, the US believed that overt Communist aggression in Asia posed a direct challenge to its interests in the region. As William Conrad Gibbons argues,  Indochina was the “key area of Asia” threatened by the Communists. Consequently, the 1950 decision to provide direct assistance to Indochina was an important policy choice accepting US responsibility in preventing a Communist hegemony in Asia.[11] This policy direction was subsequently emphasised in later years, initially by the Korean War and later by the Kennedy-Johnson escalations of the 1960s. It was also applied to both the Communist great powers. With regards to China, America was directly concerned over its involvement in Korea, fearing that such an attack would be a precursor to Chinese involvement in Indochina.[12] As for the Soviet Union, American fears were based on the premise that the Russians were intent on world domination. This led to the important policy paper NSC 68, which called for an “adequate” military shield to deter Soviet expansion and defeat aggressive Soviet-directed actions.[13] Consequently, as Stephen Ambrose argues, the paper was significant as it represented the practical extension of the Truman Doctrine.[14] In addition, NSC 68 assumed that the Russian threat was a military one, thereby suggesting that the US’s immediate concern was to strengthen its military capabilities in Communist-threatened areas such as Indochina.[15]

 

Secondly, the anticommunist factor was significant because it highlighted fears that Southeast Asia was weakly governed, and as such, was unable to stand up against the sweeping tide of communism.[16] To address this problem, the United States took a pro-active approach towards strengthening the region, embarking on support programmes to aid in its political, economic and social advancement. Its belief was that these programmes would aid the Southeast Asian governments in resisting communism through improved administrative and military capabilities.[17] They would then be able to develop and maintain a strong state, capable of resisting any subversion attempt or military aggression.[18]

 

A third and important aspect of America’s anticommunist drive was its perception that if Indochina fell to the Communists, countries in Southeast Asia would also fall one by one under Communist domination. This “domino theory”, as highlighted in the NSC 64 document, led the United States to take “all practicable measures” to curb Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indeed the effects of such a perception were significant as it directed the US in 1950 towards deciding that Indochina was the key area of Southeast Asia, and that military aid would be sent immediately.[19]

 

Although foreign political aspects were crucial in determining America’s involvement in Vietnam, its domestic situation was also highly significant. Firstly, a wave of McCarthyism had swept through the country in the 1950s. This phenomenon was based on the premise that America had suffered failures in the Cold War not because of power limitations, but through the presence of Communists in the government, a charge tantamount to “internal treason”.[20] As Stephen Ambrose explains, government officials, up to and including the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson, had to defend themselves from charges of being too soft on Communism.[21] Consequently, the Truman administration was under pressure to implement policies that would prove its anticommunist resolve, policies such as containment, which would favour a firm stance in Indochina to curb any Communist expansion there. Indeed, the spectre of McCarthyism persevered even into the 1960s, with the then Assistant Secretary of State John McNaughton warning that the US had to persist in its Vietnam effort if only to prove its anticommunist resolve.[22]

 

Secondly, American politics directly affected the country’s involvement in Vietnam. Consider the 1965 escalation, which was a result of the policies of then President Lyndon B. Johnson. In the opinion of Brian VanDeMark, escalation occurred because  Johnson feared that a loss of Vietnam would generate adverse right-wing reactions domestically. VanDeMark argues that if Johnson had faltered in his Vietnam policy, his Great Society dreams for domestic reforms would be crushed. In addition, Johnson would also have been affected by southern conservatives who opposed his civil rights policies.[23] Johnson’s domestic decisions therefore affected the US perception of the Cold War and its containment policy, which had now become “reflexive” and was “blindly [devoted]” towards challenging North Vietnam as part of a larger direct challenge to the Communist world.[24]

 

A third factor affecting America’s domestic situation was the role of the military-industrial complex. According to Senator J. William Fulbright in 1968, a large sector of the American economy was dependent on defence-related expenditure. Fulbright noted that as much as 10 per cent of the labour force depended on such defence spending to earn their living. Accordingly, the industrialists, generals and other individuals who manipulated these expenditures inevitably constituted a major political force. This powerful group was naturally instrumental in supporting any policy which would “perpetuate” foreign military commitments.[25] The group was also behind the arguments that Vietnam could be used as the testing ground for state-of-the-art American weapons. Indeed, as then President Dwight Eisenhower had warned in 1961, it was important to guard against the “acquisition of unwarranted influence… by the military-industrial complex” which was so enormous that it had no effective counterweight.[26]  Consequently, by allowing the military-industrial complex to exert such a powerful influence over its domestic situation, the United States inevitably allowed itself to be significantly involved in Vietnam.

 

US domestic misperceptions of communism also contributed to its’ involvement in Vietnam. According to James C. Thomson, a government official in the 1960s, the American government had mistakenly adopted the “domino theory” as it was ignorant about the diverse nature of Asian nationalism, its power and resilience. This resulted in the assumption that the whole of Southeast Asia would fall to the Communists should Indochina be lost. However, as Thomson argues, communism did not impact the Asian nations in a singular manner due to the “radical differences” in their history and societies.[27] In addition, the US perception of monolithic communism was also flawed as policy makers had neglected to consider the “corrosive impact” of competing nationalistic ideas within the Communist bloc, which finally led to the Sino-Soviet split in 1962.[28]

 

US credibility and prestige was a major factor contributing to the American involvement in Vietnam. Firstly, the US sought to champion the cause of post-colonial Southeast Asia. By preserving South Vietnam from the Communists, America hoped to establish a base for the eventual liberation of North Vietnam from communist hands. The country would then be able to serve as a model to demonstrate the “superiority” of US methods and to promote its liberal ideas of democracy and capitalism.[29] This was espoused in President John F. Kennedy’s idealism-laced inaugural address, promising to “pay any price, bear any burden…. to assure the survival and success of liberty”.[30] Consequently, if the US had achieved its objectives in Vietnam, it would have been able to project itself as Southeast Asia’s defender against communism and the de facto leader of a new capitalist world order.

 

A second  reason affecting American prestige was the belief that US credibility in Asia and the rest of the world would have been dented if it lost the war in Vietnam. As outlined in a 1954 NSC document, the US perceived that its prestige in Asia had been affected because it had backed the losing French forces in Indochina. In addition, the document also stated that American prestige would be inevitably linked to subsequent developments in the region.[31] Indeed this perception persisted to the 1960s, with a 1961 Rusk-McNamara report asserting that losing Vietnam would not only destroy the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), but also undermine the credibility of American commitments elsewhere.[32] This point was emphasised by President Lyndon B. Johnson in a 1965 speech, where he asserted that to abandon Vietnam to her fate would be to “shake the  confidence of [the] people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word.”[33] Consequently, such ingrained Cold War thinking about the “credibility of containment” favoured the formulation of government policies that pushed for escalation in Vietnam.[34]

 

Thirdly, the “arrogance of power” also explained the US experience in Vietnam. As J. William Fulbright argues, America’s involvement in Vietnam underscored a lack of confidence in its policies and actions. Fulbright asserts that powerful nations lacking in self-confidence tend to behave in a manner dangerous to itself and others. This is because these nations feel the need to prove what is obvious to others. In the process, they often “confuse great power with unlimited power and great responsibility with total responsibility”.[35] Consequently, an American obsession with the containment of communism reflected an insecurity with its own ideological supremacy and a vulnerability towards its own notions of credibility and prestige.

 

In conclusion, the reasons for the American involvement in Vietnam were multifaceted and involved an interplay of various factors. As noted by Harry G. Summers, “ [the] great tragedy of the Vietnam War was [that] all of [its] military effort, great bravery and sacrifice… was totally unfocused because of the lack of a goal.”[36] This was in direct contradiction to the conventional wisdom and rhetoric that Vietnam was a black-and-white struggle against communism, and that by involving itself, America sought to “[assist] the free nations of the area [in defending] their freedom”.[37] Indeed, the Vietnam experience had also been entangled with the American domestic situation, as well as tainted by misperceptions of its credibility and prestige. Consequently, no one factor can be isolated as the reason behind the United States’ involvement in Vietnam. 

The above essay was written by Mark Lim Shan-Loong on 7th October 1999.

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---. Extract of NSC 5492/2 - Review of US Policy in the Far East. 20 Aug 1954. Vietnam:  A History in Documents. Ed. Gareth Porter. New York and Ontario: New American Library, 1981. 164-6.