The Quest for European Supremacy -   Power, Consensus & Security in Western Europe

Introduction

            “The United States says it wants a clear phone number for a Europe with some real cohesion, but when we try to give it one, we have problems.” Referring to the European Union’s (EU) decision to raise a 60,000 strong rapid reaction corps by the year 2003, German Ambassador to the US Jcrgen Chrobog underlines the inherent difficulties between America and Western Europe in defining a consensual post-Cold War European security structure.[1]  Indeed, the growing disparity in American and Western European opinions has come to the fore recently, in the light of an increased European assertiveness towards managing its own security issues.

The trend towards greater European assertiveness arose after the collapse of the Cold War, which generated a new range of security issues, among them a shift from US-Soviet bipolarity to that of a multipolar configuration featuring multiple actors. In responding to these global changes, Western European nations have sought new foreign policy actions that demonstrate their desire to play a greater role in the construction of European security, while at the same time recognising the primus inter pares nature of US leadership. This paper will therefore provide insight into how power is employed in the creation of Western European security, as seen in the different nations’ attitudes towards Europe’s security institutions. Consequently, the paper suggests that Western Europe as an entity has managed to obtain considerable concessions from the US in terms of shaping its existing security structure. However, the disunity among the individual European nations has resulted in the continued influence of the US, which remains primary in the process of making foreign policy in Western Europe, and in shaping its security structure.

In discussing Western European security, the paper will be organised into four main sections. The first section will deal with how the changing post-Cold War climate has shaped the key European security institutions as embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the second section, the changing foreign policy perspectives of the major European actors will be discussed, as well as their role in shaping European security. This will be followed by the third section, which describes the US response and its importance to Europe, as well as how American post-Cold War foreign policy in Europe has influenced the regional security structure. Finally, the fourth section will examine how European security is shaped and discuss the conflicting nature of European assertiveness vis a vis US dominance in Europe.  

The Changing Face of Post-Cold War European Security

The post-Cold War shift from bipolarity to a multipolarity resulted in increased uncertainty and unpredictability in Europe’s security structure. This was because it was accompanied by new problems such as nuclear and chemical proliferation, the resurfacing of ethno-nationalism and the issue of adapting and restructuring conventional armed forces and defence industries. In addition, the Gulf War invasion of Kuwait resulted in an increased emphasis on states’ sovereignty and caused Western policy-makers to be more willing to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states in the name of humanitarian interventionism.[2] To this end, Western European nations have focussed increasingly on multilateralism, and have relied more on security institutions to resolve the post-Cold War challenges. Accordingly, the various nations’ reliance on such institutions was mandated by their usefulness in being able to adapt to a post-Cold War world.[3] This institutional adjustment can be seen in the three levels by which Western Europe approached the security issue -  in the European, Atlantic and pan-European approaches to security.    

The Pan-European Approach to Security: the OSCE

On a pan-European level, the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe originated as a Conference to discuss the direction and give impulse to the shaping of Europe. After the Cold War, the Conference was crucial in enhancing stability in Europe through its role as a forum for consultation and cooperation, especially in conflict prevention, dispute settlement and arms control negotiation.[4] Significantly, items such as human rights and the environment began to find their way into the security agenda, alongside issues such as the enhancement of confidence and security among states.

The Conference subsequently underwent institutionalisation, and was reorganised by the mid-1990s as an Organisation. By the turn of the century, the OSCE began to emerge as a regional organisation for conflict management, from an early warning mechanism involving conflict prevention to crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This has positioned the OSCE as an inclusive and comprehensive organisation for consultation, decision-making and cooperation in Europe.[5] However, its all-encompassing membership and consensual procedures have affected the institution’s effectiveness, and limited its enforcement capabilities as well as its impact.[6]

The Atlantic Approach to Security: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

As a Cold War mechanism, NATO served the primary function of being the political and economic rival of the Warsaw Pact. However, with the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, the organisation was forced to search for a new role in order to remain relevant to the post-Cold War world. It did so by attempting to handle the immediate post-Cold War concerns involving disarmament and the repositioning of a unified Germany, as well as relations with the former Soviet Union.

By the mid-1990s, there was a need to reconsider the security approach of NATO as disarmament was in process and the German unification had proceeded relatively smoothly, with the new state integrated into the Western Europe apparatus. The organisation consequently sought policies that both strengthened existing partnerships and expanded eastwards to encompass the Eastern European states. This can be seen especially in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council initiatives, which aimed to strengthen NATO’s relationships with members of the former Soviet bloc.

By the end of the century, there was yet another need to critically question NATO’s changing role. This was especially true after the NATO bombing of Kosovo, which further questioned NATO’s security role, given that the organisation had made a military offensive against the Serbian forces, a change from its original defence-related aims. In addition, questions remained about the need for continued US involvement in Europe as well as the possible inclusion of Russia into NATO, as postulated by then Acting President Vladimir Putin. NATO is therefore in the process of addressing such concerns, and its functions have tended to head towards crisis management and peacekeeping.[7] It has, however, remained as the key European security institution, as reflected in the centrality of the organisation in determining European security issues.

The European Approach to Security:  the Western European Union

The WEU, in playing the chief role of consolidating intra-European cooperation, served primarily to coordinate ties with NATO and to promote foreign policy and defence cooperation in the European Community. This was expressed in the 1991 Paris Communique, which outlined the role of the WEU in the new security architecture.[8]

By the mid-1990s, the WEU’s function had been centred towards the development of the EU, especially in the evolution of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Identity (EDSI), which paved the way for a more distinct European identity through greater political integration and in maintaining the goal of collective security. However, the organisation remained the defence arm of the EU, as outlined in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, which identified the WEU to be integral towards implementing the defence-related decisons of the EU. At the same time, the WEU also continued to serve as a transatlantic bridge thorough NATO, and in supporting a cooperative security framework through the OSCE.[9]

At the turn of the century, the WEU now serves as a platform for conflict prevention and crisis management especially through the development of permanent political and military structures and the ability to deploy a corps level military operation within two months, sustaining it for at least a year.[10] These military capabilities, in addition to the proposed 60,000 strong rapid reaction corps, equip Europe with the ability to manage personal crises on its continent without the need for foreign assistance, resulting in a more independent Europe. However, this drive towards a greater European identity has not established the WEU as the primary security European institution, but has instead emphasised the secondary role of the organisation, with regards to its supportive functions of NATO within the larger European security framework.

Western Europe’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy - Perspectives & Strategies

In discussing how power is employed in Western Europe, Andrew Moravcsik argues that multilateral initiatives in Europe were mostly initiated by the major European players of Germany, France and Britain, as can be seen in the few initiatives proposed or vetoed by smaller nations.[11] Consequently, it is important to examine the foreign policy preferences of these three major powers and the extent to which they have influenced the European security architecture.

Germany

The post-Cold War state structure profoundly affected German foreign by changing four major structural constraints imposed on Germany in the Cold War era – the Soviet threat, dependence on the US and other Western European states, the post-World War Two partitioning of Germany and the historical suspicions of Germany’s neighbours.[12]

Of these four factors, the greatest impact can be seen in the unification of Germany, which reversed the post-World War Two partitioning of the country. This changed the country’s economic power and its military potential, as well as restored the country to its traditional role as a Central European power despite being part of Western Europe.[13] The “Soviet” threat, although not eliminated totally, has declined considerably as Russia no longer has the ability to threaten Germany through conventional military means without a one-year warning period. This has led to a decreased need for Berlin to depend on its Western allies for defence, although it has not ruled out an increased need for economic dependence.[14] Historical suspicions among Germany’s neighbours similarly persist, and Berlin has been treated with greater mistrust due to its increased power. However, there is a contradictory demand for the country to increase its global responsibility in areas such as peacekeeping and economics as a means of keeping up with its enhanced status and power.[15]

Inasmuch as Germany’s foreign policy has been shaped by changes in its external environment, it is also important to consider the domestic setting in which German foreign policy is determined. This can be seen in three major ways – the impact of unification, structural problems in the economy and the influence of Germany’s national security culture.[16]

Germany’s unification was not without cost, with significant finances required to rebuild eastern Germany’s economic and social infrastructure. To meet these expenses, large debts were incurred by the German government and this resulted in fewer available resources for the country to pursue its foreign policy initiatives.[17] Related to these economic woes were the inherent structural problems in the German economy. This occurred largely as a result of the slow growth of economic productivity which had been present since the early to mid-1980s. It decreased the international competitiveness of the German economy and resulted in manufacturers shifting their production centres to cheaper sites in Eastern Europe after the ending of the Cold War.[18] In total, these economic constraints limited the amount of money available for promoting stability in Eastern Europe and also precipitated increased cuts in the already much-reduced military budget, compounding Germany’s problems in restructuring the country’s armed forces.[19] Berlin’s national security culture has also been an important determinant of its foreign policy. For instance, the German constitution has prohibited participation in wars of aggression, but  at the same time permits deep involvement in international security institutions with the intention of promoting collective security.[20] This has resulted in active German participation in the existing European security institutions. In addition, Germany’s defeat in World War Two has largely influenced society by discrediting radical notions of German nationalism, favouring a pro-Europe stance with a foreign policy role largely confined to Europe. This has also affected the German view of the military, which suggests that the bundeswehr should be limited almost exclusively to national self-defence and German power pursued instead through economic, political and diplomatic means.[21]

Considering the impact of the post-Cold War external environment and Germany’s domestic climate in affecting German foreign policy, it is not unexpected that the country’s security concerns have largely been focussed on influencing the external environment in order to make it less threatening, strengthening Europe’s security institutions to address possible threats, and transforming the German military to conform to the post-Cold War climate.[22] In all these areas, Germany’s foreign policy focus has largely been channelled through European security institutions, which have been the avenue for Germany to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Indeed analysts have argued that German interests need to be pursued through multilateralism, which would help to reduce the tension between Berlin and its Western allies.[23] It is therefore important to examine German attitudes towards the major European security institutions, in order to understand how the country has attempted to further its foreign policy goals.

Germany & Europe’s Security Institutions

German interests in the OSCE have largely been shaped by the pan-European nature of the organisation, which endows it with the political legitimacy of the entire continent. This inclusive nature has allowed various issues such as arms control and conflict management to be addressed at a low cost due to the organisation’s low degree of institutionalisation.[24] The inclusiveness of the OSCE has also benefited Germany by avoiding the isolation of Russia from Europe, allowing Berlin an opportunity to circumvent the “Soviet” threat through increased engagements with its main European rival. Related to this issue has been the increased German leverage over the former Soviet bloc states, which now have to justify their positions towards their inter-state relations and how they treat their own citizens.[25]

In its pursuit of such aims, Germany took an initial active position in the promotion of the OSCE’s mandate and capabilities. For instance, it promoted the institutionalisation of the OSCE as a UN regional arrangement, empowered to authorise peacekeeping operations.[26] On the security front, Germany pushed for new talks on arms control and confidence building measures, as well as established a Code of Conduct detailing the politico-military aspects of European security.[27] In addition, the country was able to promote the admission of Soviet successor states and achieve a “consensus minus one” policy for OSCE operations.[28]

Towards the late 1990s, Germany decreased its expectations on the capability of the OSCE, partly due to its inability to handle the Yugoslav crisis. This was the OSCE’s options and instruments reached a limit in a conflict when parties in a conflict do not want peace. Hence, there was a shift towards German emphasis on the OSCE’s capability for the prevention and early warning of conflicts, rather than as the primary instrument for conflict resolution.[29]

NATO has been important for Germany especially because of the value of the transatlantic partnership with the United States, which Germany believes to be an important anchor of its security policies. This is because American military ties to Europe have been essential towards maintaining peace and stability on the European continent.[30] NATO has also been important in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe, and in offsetting Russia’s military power, especially since Germany lacks a nuclear arsenal, and has to depend on the US to provide such a security guarantee.[31] An important aspect of German interests in NATO lies in the idea that the organisation serves as an avenue for the denationalisation of the German military, especially as seen in the Kosovo bombings.[32] Consequently, Germany’s involvement in NATO has served to address issues of increased German responsibility in security issues while at the same time allaying neighbouring countries’ fears of a German military resurgence.

In order to attain these aims in NATO, Germany has mainly sought to revitalise NATO in the wake of the Cold War. It has been critical in the development of NATO’s post-1990 strategic concept, especially in the adaptation of NATO’s nuclear policy of “flexible response”, altering it to promote “no first use” of nuclear weapons.[33] In addition, Germany has also worked to change the nature of NATO itself, steering it from a defence organisation to one actively participating in crisis prevention and management.[34] The country has also been essential in reshaping NATO’s conventional force structure, increasing military integration through the establishment of increased multinational units, which also helped to allay Germany’s neighbours’ fears now that it was part of a multinational force committed to multilateral European security.[35] In attempting to establish ties with Eastern and Central Europe, Germany has been instrumental in the development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) with the aim of bringing together NATO countries and the former Soviet bloc states so as to stabilise the country’s eastern borders. It has also approached NATO enlargement in a similar manner, favouring a more conservative position so as not to isolate Russia.[36]

Germany’s interests in the WEU have been principally in the area of European integration, believing it indispensable towards promoting stability and lasting peace on the continent.[37] Concurrently, neither the OSCE nor NATO provides the infrastructure for the pursuit of German economic interests, which can be furthered through the EU, with the WEU as part of a broader politico-economic framework.[38] Berlin has therefore approached the WEU as a means to advance its political and economic interests, as well as to fulfil its international responsibilities through participation in a “Europeanisation” process. Moreover, German commitment towards European integration would also assist in reassuring Berlin’s neighbours of its intentions for peace.[39] Consequently, Germany has been a prominent advocate towards creating a European Security and Defence Identity (EDSI), especially drawn along the lines of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the creation of the multinational Eurocorps. In establishing a framework for the CFSP, Germany promoted and achieved a security policy aimed at leading progressively towards a common European defence. This also established the WEU as the chief defence component of the EU, encompassing peacekeeping and crisis management, and even peacemaking missions.[40] In developing a multinational Eurocorps, Germany promoted a European concept of defence involving peacekeeping and peacemaking operations that could defend WEU territory if NATO failed to intervene in any particular crisis.[41]

France

The post-Cold War era has had a distinct, although delayed, impact on France’s foreign policy direction. In the initial post-Cold War years, France’s foreign policy objectives did not change much because there appeared to be no need to depart from the established policy of Gaullism. French foreign policy also lacked a fundamental vision, resulting in its omni-directional approach.[42]

The Gaullist model of consensus, which was shaped by both the norms and politics of the state system and society, focussed on elements of national independence, grandeur and nuclear autonomy.[43] For instance, national independence demonstrated a need for autonomy from the US and from NATO, and also called for increased European security under French leadership. As for grandeur, it implied that France’s role in the world should be increased, but without taking unacceptable risks and without destroying an interdependence in Europe, which was deemed to be equally important as independence in the survival and development of a national community. Nuclear autonomy was important to France as this included aspects of both national independence and grandeur, promoting both through the pursuit of an independent nuclear policy.

Within a couple of years after the Cold War, French foreign policy experienced a shift in direction, because of three main determinants - the failure of collective security in Yugoslavia, a need to establish a European defence system and a need to maintain national independence.[44] For instance, the failure of collective security towards solving the Yugoslav crisis led France to realise that a strong NATO, led by the US, was important towards a secure Europe.[45] However, there was also a need to reassure Europeans about integration despite this failure, and France consequently embarked on manoeuvres towards the establishment of a European defence system.  This resulted in bold advances towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as an increased reliance in European institutions, involving a decrease in French military spending and the phasing out of a conscription army in a bid to abandon the Gaullist concept of military self-sufficiency.[46] It also resulted in France’s promotion of a majority voting system allowing a military but not financial opting-out so that countries can act jointly without being held hostage to the wishes of an individual country. At the same time, France realised that European integration was promoted at a high cost to national independence. This caused the country to promote an effective veto system which prevented the majority of states from passing a policy that Paris could be held hostage to, as seen in the European reluctance but eventual agreement to Germany’s  recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.[47] In summation, these post-Gaullist changes in French foreign policy resulted in a multifaceted approach, which  led to an ambiguous policy decreasing French leadership role in Europe.

France & Europe’s Security Institutions

                French interest in the OSCE stems from its preference towards a looser arrangement of states in order to safeguard its national independence. The OSCE has also been viewed by the French as an alternative to the US-dominant NATO in promoting collective security and defence in Europe. This can be seen in the French proposal to strengthen the then CSCE in the early 1990s and its 1996 bid to reinforce the OSCE with military expertise in order to authorise peacekeeping operations.[48]

In addition, the OSCE, as a pan-European organisation, is the only European institution which involves Russia, and as such avoids the isolation of Russia in European security decision-making. As Paris shares similar security concerns to Berlin regarding the potential threat posed by Russia, the OSCE consequently serves as a forum for important issues such as arms control to be discussed by the most number of states, enabling a flexible response to Europe’s most critical issues.

In the post-Cold War era, France has increased its appreciation of the transatlantic relationship with the US, and has seen NATO as a means of enhancing this partnership.[49] This is because Paris, like Berlin, sees NATO as a means of anchoring the US to Europe, and the American military as a force to ensure the security of Europe, as can be seen from the Yugoslav and Kosovo crises. Moreover, an enlarged NATO with a strong integrated command, linked by charters to Russia and Eastern Europe, ensured the primacy of the organisation over pan-European organisations like the OSCE.[50] In addition, differences over the role of European security organisations like the WEU have relegated their importance as secondary to NATO, allowing the institution a greater contribution towards the security of Europe. 

However, despite French recognition that a US role is important to Europe’s security, the country has also expressed a desire to maintain its national independence, as can be seen by its military isolation from NATO until the late 1990s.  This can be explained by the country’s reluctance to allow America to totally dominate the proceedings in Europe. Indeed the French agreed to NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept only because it allowed the country to join in peacekeeping operations without being a part of NATO’s integrated military command.[51]

French interest in the WEU has been geared towards the promotion of European integration and the creation of an independent defence entity separate from the influences of the US and NATO. This is because France, like Germany, recognises the importance of European autonomy, which it believes should exist alongside the NATO alliance.[52] There was therefore a consequent shift from the 1980s’ stance that any European defence organisation served merely as  “European pillar” of NATO, towards the position that Europe deserved a more separate entity of its own. This can be reflected in the promotion of the Maastricht Treaty to bind Germany to a Western European alliance, as well as the promotion of the CFSP as a means of advancing European collective security in an era of German post-unification, so as to counterbalance the US influence in Europe.[53] In addition, the development of the Eurocorps has also served to emphasise a French need for competing European and transatlantic security structures.

Despite such French initiatives at creating a distinct European defence identity, the country also believes that in the short to medium term, European initiatives cannot replace the primacy of US-led NATO. Consequently, any WEU initiatives should only be made within the auspices of a NATO framework, embodying the policy of “NATO first, Europe second”. To this end, France has pursued a different path from Germany, and rejected the idea of totally integrating the WEU and the EU, proposing that the WEU should serve only as the defence arm of the EU.[54]

Britain

Of the three major actors in post-Cold War Europe, Britain’s foreign policy has been the least affected by the ending of the Cold War. There have been major changes in the direction of British foreign policy, but in totality, these changes have not been able to match the rapid pace of transformation experienced in the other parts of Europe.

Consider British interests in post-Cold War Europe. These have been focussed primarily on the preservation of London’s national interests, pursued through a reliance on NATO and the US, with the pursuit of a European defence identity only as a secondary measure. Consequently, the shift in British foreign policy has been geared towards a predominantly Atlantic orientation, as can been seen in the three areas of change – in the defence policy realignment, in the decreases in military size and the increased British alignment towards US/NATO.[55]

For instance, British policy papers re-examining the country’s post-Cold War defence policy merely established the need to secure UK territory from possible and existing external threats as well as to promote security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability.[56] This merely reflected a shift in NATO’s dominant Cold War ideology and was not by itself a significant foreign policy change. As for the reduction of military personnel and equipment, this was outlined in the 1990 “Options for Change”, and stemmed largely from the depressed state of the British economy. As a result, Britain’s defence expenditure was considerably decreased, and was estimated to have been cut by 25-30% between 1990 and 2000.[57] Despite the reduced “power projection”, British policymakers were confident that the country’s highly professional army would still be able to fight a high-intensity war with the deployment of a significant number of troops, a confidence that arose largely because of a heightened reliance on US/NATO ties.[58] Similarly, London’s fears that the US would withdraw from Europe led the country to increase its alignment with NATO, in a bid to anchor the US military to continue its role in guaranteeing European security.

Britain & Europe’s Security Institutions

As outlined in the 1992 Defence White Paper, Britain envisaged OSCE engagement as a means of promoting wider British security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability.[59] As such, the organisation served as a “flexible” forum where strategic issues like arms control could be discussed without compromising aspects of British sovereignty, a position similar to that expressed by France. This has enabled Britain to preserve its national interests and at the same time promoting European security through engaging important security and defence issues.

In addition, the OSCE has also served as a means to demonstrate Britain’s commitment to collective security, as expressed through its desire to station its military forces on the continent through the multinational umbrella of the OSCE. This also serves to maintain London’s influence in diplomatic and military circles, and acts as a restraint against the development of parallel European structures. Such a multinational force would also serve to avert regressive tendencies of nationalism especially in Germany and France.[60]

Like Germany and France, Britain believes that America should be involved in European security. This has resulted in London adopting a strongly positive stance towards NATO, as reflected in its belief that European security should be underwritten by a strong US/NATO leadership. NATO’s importance is therefore linked to the value ascribed to transatlantic debates and armament cooperation. In addition to the primary role of NATO as a means to engage the US in Europe, Britain also values the organisation as a credible and effective guarantee of its members’ territory, especially in the peaceful engagement of military forces within the continent, with the aim of maintaining the security of Europe as a whole.[61]

To this end, Britain has consistently pursued policy measures increasing its role in NATO, such as by undertaking a leading role among the European powers in NATO’s Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). This involved a British commitment of at least 8 out of the 15 initial brigades constituting the initial ARRC force. By adopting such a leading posture in the ARRC, London’s leadership of the European NATO countries was confirmed within the context of a NATO-led security system.[62] In addition to British involvement in the ARRC, the country was also supportive of NATO’s initiatives to be linked to the peacekeeping process. This could be seen in the British acceptance of NATO’s role as an organising body for the peacekeeping needs of both the UN and the OSCE.[63]

Despite Britain’s strong support of NATO’s operations in Europe, the country is hesitant to expand NATO membership because it is cautious about having to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of additional states. In addition, if states are admitted to NATO because they are free democracies, there is the possibility of having to agree to Russian membership or face a destabilisation of ties with Moscow, especially if it was to be refused membership.[64]

Unlike Germany and France, Britain views the WEU primarily as a means of strengthening the European pillar of its Atlantic alliance, and not purely to promote greater “Europeanisation”. Consequently, London holds the view that any European security framework should be complimentary to NATO, even though it promotes a European identity independent of NATO. To this effect, the WEU could be involved directly in peacekeeping operations either as a secondary role to NATO or in the event of US disinterest.[65] This is not to mean that European interests should be subjugated to US interests, but should be viewed more as a hedge against overwhelming American influence in Europe, as can be seen in the British refusal to lift the Bosnian arms embargo in 1993.[66]

Additionally, London views the WEU as a defence arm of the EU, with the aim of maintaining the peace and stability of Europe. This is to guard against a possible US withdrawal from Western Europe. In addition, British policy favours the promotion of the WEU as a “bridge” linking the EU and NATO.[67] To this end, Britain has been integral towards framing the WEU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) such that it is compatible to NATO and does not “prejudice” the security and defence policies effected by NATO.

The United States in Europe – Its Role in European Security

            In any discussion on the construction of Western European security, it is important to consider the role of the United States. This is because America has been a crucial player in European security since the post-World War Two reconstruction of the continent, which left the country facing its Cold War foe, the Soviet Union.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the important Atlantic relationship did not diminish in significance, and was instead strengthened, reaffirming the primacy of America in European security. This continued significance of the US to post-Cold War Europe can be explained by two main reasons – the remaining possibility of a Russian threat and the lack of European unity and strength.[68]

Although post-Cold War Russia no longer has the military ability to threaten Europe directly, its social and economic instability, coupled with the resurgence of the Communist and nationalist parties, have renewed fears of Russian reassertion of power.[69] In addition, increased military action by Moscow has also renewed concerns in Europe about the country’s European intentions, which can be exemplified by the concerned response from Russia’s European counterparts over its recent campaigns in Chechnya and President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions for a “Greater Russia”.

A continued need for the US to serve as a European power can be seen by Western Europe’s lack of military strength as well as its failure to agree on a cohesive collective security policy. This is illustrated by the decreased military spending policies in Western Europe despite American calls for increased “burden sharing”, which have led to concerns that European nations are “free riders” in preserving continental security.[70] There has also been the failure of consensus among Western European nations with regards to European security arrangements such as the European Security and Defence Identity (EDSI) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  This lack of a cohesive European response to crises has ensured the US’s primacy in ensuring European security, as can be seen by the increased role of US-led NATO in the Balkans.[71]

US Post-Cold War Foreign Policy in Europe

            While Cold War American foreign policy in Europe had been shaped with the intention of preventing the Soviet Union from dominating Europe, this is no longer the case in the post-Cold War era. The United States has now emerged as primus inter pares, and while it is still the largest and most influential power in the continent, it no longer enjoys the full discretionary power it had in the Cold War era.[72] This has elicited domestic concern over America’s “decline” in power, leading various proponents to call for an isolationist foreign policy and withdrawal from Europe. However, the US has instead opted for increased engagement in Europe, as it maintains that its national interests remain linked to the political evolution of post-Communist Europe. To this end, Washington has sought European stability with the aim of preserving an open world order conducive for pan-European, and consequently, international peace and prosperity.[73]

In conjunction with the post-Cold War rise of multiple centres of power, there is now a need to balance US interests with Western European desires and capabilities. Consequently, America has to remain engaged in Europe while at the same time avoiding marginalisation in Western European affairs and in its diplomatic enterprises.[74] Washington therefore has to deal with European demands for greater autonomy while at the same time attempting to preserve its mantle of leadership through relying on its superior military and political power, a position of being “in, but not of Europe”.[75]

The US & European Security Institutions

In order to adequately address European issues while at the same time maintaining a voice in Western European security, America has chiefly resorted to multilateralism, which serves to legitimise US interests through the consensus-making process. Consequently, the country has been intimately involved in the European security architecture, and in shaping the security institutions of post-Cold War Europe.

            In its attempt to retain control over Western Europe, as in the Cold War years, Washington has utilised NATO as its institution of choice in post-Cold War Europe. This can be seen through the numerous changes America has initiated in NATO to facilitate the evolution of the organisation to a post-Cold War world. For instance, the development of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was initiated to promote rapprochement with former Communist states as part of America’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) efforts.[76] In addition, NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept enabled America to assert leadership in European security because it retained veto power over use of NATO assets despite allowing the WEU the power to use the CJTF for its initiatives such as the CFSP.[77] Similarly, Western Europe’s efforts at developing an EDSI were allowed to continue provided it established the US as the cornerstone of its policy, and operated only as a European pillar within NATO. This was similar to the US agreement to the WEU being the defence arm of the EU only if it acknowledged the primacy of NATO in the European security arena.[78] As can be seen in all these multilateral agreements, the US allowed Western Europe greater autonomy in European affairs, but only if it acknowledged the continued significance of America’s role in Europe.

Shaping Europe’s Security – More Europe or More America?

As can be seen, the shaping of European security is a delicate process involving a consensus in foreign policy making by the major Western European actors of Germany, France and Britain, as well as by the only superpower of the post-Cold War world, the United States. In their search for a consensus on the new security structure, these four major powers have modified some of their foreign policy preferences in exchange for the acceptance of some of their other policy objectives. This can be seen not only in the multilateral discussions, but in the bilateral relationships such as the Franco-German partnership or the Anglo-American friendship. Hence, the shaping of post-Cold War European security has been through an interplay of power between these four major countries, which has been the underlying issue behind the tensions of European assertiveness and American dominance.

Accordingly, the convergence of the German, French and British positions has resulted in a greater European influence over the security institutions of the OSCE, NATO and the WEU. This can be seen especially in the common objective of these three countries in establishing a CFSP for the WEU, despite initial American objections. Similarly, the convergence in the European position has also ensured that the OSCE remains a “flexible” pan-European organisation for crisis management, and that NATO serves to anchor the US to Europe. However, the differences in the European positions have ensured that American influence remains dominant in determining European security. For instance, the inability of the European countries to agree on the future of the WEU, has made certain that the organisation remains secondary to US-led NATO.

Consequently, Western European countries have succeeded substantially towards determining their security climate. However, because of the individual tensions among the various Western European states, disunity in foreign policy has resulted in a lack of convergence on the European front, sustaining a weak position that has easily been overtaken by the strong US influence in Europe.

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